

bulletin





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Report on the Foreign Ministers Conference

Address by Secretary Dulles¹

For the last 3 weeks the British, the French, and ourselves have been negotiating with the Russians at Geneva. I got back yesterday and reported fully to the President in a talk which began last evening and was resumed this morning. Now I am reporting to you, the American people.

As I expect most of you know, this Geneva meeting did not reach any agreements. As a result many questions are in the air.

Does this mean that the so-called "spirit of Geneva" is dead?

Does it mean that the risk of war has increased?

Will the so-called "cold war" be resumed in full vigor?

Will the United States now have to change basically its military and mutual security programs?

Does it mean an end to negotiating with the Soviet Union?

I shall try to answer all of these questions.

First of all, however, I would like to recall how this latest Geneva conference came about.

I go back to last spring. Until then Soviet Russia had been pursuing a menacing policy. That was Stalin's line. He believed it was possible to ride roughshod over the free nations.

After Stalin died that effort continued for a time. The Soviets made intense and blustering efforts to keep West Germany apart from the other Western European nations. Despite this, the Federal Republic of Germany last May joined NATO and the Brussels Treaty creating Western European Union.

This Soviet failure was followed by a change in the Soviet demeanor. Stalin's successors pro-

fessed, at least superficially, to desire cooperative relations with the free nations. And they made important concessions for this purpose.

For example, they had for 8 years refused to sign the treaty which would give Austria her freedom. But last May they signed that treaty and pulled the Red Army out of Austria.

They made their peace with Tito, who for 7 years had been the object of their most bitter attacks because he had taken Yugoslavia out of the Soviet bloc.

They moderated their propaganda and their manners.

They made it clear that they would like to sit down and talk with the Western nations.

The United States responded, as it always will respond, to any prospect, however slight, of making peace more just and durable. That response was backed up with virtual unanimity and on a bipartisan basis. So the United States joined with Britain and France to invite the Soviet leaders to the summit conference at Geneva. There President Eisenhower met for 6 days with the Heads of the other three Governments in an effort to create a better atmosphere and a new impulse toward the solution of the problems that divide us.

That meeting indicated a desire on all sides to end the bitterness and harshness which could generate war. War, all recognized, would be a common disaster.

In addition, the Heads of Government agreed that their Foreign Ministers should get together in October to negotiate about European security and the problem of Germany, about the limitation of armament, and about the reduction of barriers between the Soviet bloc and the free world.

The three Western leaders recognized that the value of the summit conference would be largely

¹ Made to the Nation over radio and television on Nov. 18 (press release 659).

determined by subsequent results. Thus, President Eisenhower, in the closing speech of the conference, said,²

Only history will tell the true worth and real values of our session together. The followthrough from this beginning by our respective governments will be decisive in the measure of this conference.

Following the summit conference the United States, in cooperation with Britain, France, and the Federal Republic of Germany, prepared thoroughly for this Foreign Ministers conference that was to come.

We were fully aware of the complexity of the problems which we faced. The summit conference had shown deep differences on the issues of German unity and European security, disarmament, and freer contacts. To be acceptable, solutions of these problems must take account of legitimate interests on both sides—especially as to security.

Our preparations for the meeting recognized this basic fact. The Western proposals provided the basis for real negotiations with the Soviet Union.

In my initial statement to the conference,³ I expressed the point of view I have just outlined. "The United States," I said, came "to this meeting dedicated to exploring patiently and sincerely all possible approaches to realistic solutions of these problems."

Despite the effort, no specific agreements were reached.

The explanation, as I see it, is this: The Soviet Union appears to want certain results in terms of European security, disarmament, and contacts of a sort. But it is not yet willing to pay the price needed to get these results. And when I say pay the price, I do not refer to bargaining terms. I mean the price in terms of doing what is inherently necessary to reach the results which we all say we want.

Let me illustrate what I mean by telling you what happened at the conference.

European Security and Germany

First of all, we talked about European security and Germany. The Soviet Union wanted security against the possible resurgence of German militarism. This was not unreasonable in the light of

what the Russians had suffered from the German armies during World War II. The Western powers were indeed prepared to meet the Soviet Union in this matter.

We made security proposals of a serious and far-reaching nature.⁴ Perhaps the best proof of their merit is the fact that the Soviet delegation later came up with security proposals which copied many features of our own.⁵

But there was one basic and decisive difference. Our proposals were based upon the reunification of Germany. We do not believe that solid peace in Europe can be based on the injustice of a divided Germany. The Soviet proposals were based on preserving the Soviet puppet regime in East Germany and the indefinite division of Germany, at least unless Soviet control could be extended to all Germany.

The Soviet Union at the summit conference had explicitly promised to consider the reunification of Germany by free elections and had explicitly recognized the close link between the reunification of Germany and European security.

We tried hard, but in vain, to get the Soviet delegation to discuss seriously the problem of the reunification of Germany.

When the Soviet Union came to face up to what that involved, it balked. Obviously, if Germany were reunified by free elections this would mean the end of the puppet regime which the Soviet Union has installed in East Germany. This in turn would almost surely have serious repercussions upon the other satellite countries of Eastern Europe. There the Soviet-controlled governments are facing rising pressure. Many within the satellite countries believe that the "spirit of Geneva" means that they are entitled to more tolerance and to governments more responsive to the needs and aspirations of their own nation.

So the Soviet Union took the position that while they were eager to get a treaty of European security they would not be willing to sacrifice their East German regime to get it. Despite what they had agreed to at the summit conference, they declared they would preserve their regime in East Germany, in clear defiance of the ardent wishes of the East Germans themselves.

Some had thought that the Soviet Union might be willing to allow Germany to be reunified by free

² BULLETIN of Aug. 1, 1955, p. 171.

³ *Ibid.*, Nov. 7, 1955, p. 727.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 729.

⁵ *Ibid.*, Nov. 14, 1955, p. 783.

elections if reunified Germany would not enter the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. But in fact the Soviet delegation made it abundantly clear that it would not permit Germany to be reunified by free election even on such terms.

So we see that, although the Soviet Union doubtless wants a European security system to which it is a party, it is not willing to provide an essential prerequisite, namely, the reunification of Germany in freedom.

Limitation of Armament

The second problem that we had to discuss was that of limitation of armament. Primary responsibility in this field is now with the United Nations disarmament subcommittee. But the Foreign Ministers were directed to help if they could.

Both sides showed an eager desire to bring about limitation of armament. We want this both as an aid to peace and to permit economic resources to be devoted in greater measure to the benefit of mankind. But the Western nations are unwilling to agree to disarm unless we can be sure that both sides are carrying out the agreement. That is why we insist that disarmament be effectively supervised and controlled.

Three times in this century the United States experience has shown that one-sided weakness in disarmament does not in fact preserve peace. The United States does not intend now to risk its very existence upon promises which may not be kept.

The United States is, however, second to none in its desire for safeguarded reduction of armaments. It was to make that more possible that President Eisenhower, at the summit conference, proposed to the Soviet Union an exchange of blueprints of military establishments, and then aerial inspection to verify the blueprints and thereby improve the atmosphere by dispelling the fear of aggressive intentions on either side.⁷ That concept of President Eisenhower was rejected by the Soviets, although they did recognize for the first time that aerial inspection had a proper place in a control system.

But the Soviet Union does not attach the importance which we do to inspection and control. It continued to urge agreements, even though there was no way to check adequately whether these agreements were being fulfilled.

⁷ *Ibid.*, Aug. 1, 1955, p. 174.

So our discussion of disarmament was inconclusive. We left further development of the subject to the United Nations subcommittee on disarmament.

It seems that the Soviet Government feels as yet unable to allow inspection and control which, if it is adequate, would open up their society, which is still largely based on secretiveness. So the Soviet Union, while wanting the immense benefits that could come from reduction of armament, is not willing to submit itself to the safeguards which would make this possible.

East-West Contacts

The third and final item of our agenda was the development of contacts between the East and the West. The Western powers put forward 17 proposals of a concrete nature.⁷ Many of these would have involved the freer exchange of ideas, information, and news. All such proposals the Soviet delegation rejected. It was willing to have contacts which would enable it to garner technical knowhow from other countries. It was willing to send and receive persons under conditions which it could closely control.⁸ But it reacted violently against anything that smacked of the elimination of barriers to a freer exchange of ideas. It abhorred the introduction into the Soviet bloc of thoughts which might be contrary to the official doctrine of the Soviet Communist Party.

So we reached no agreement on this topic.

The reason again is clear. We believe that human contacts are designed, not to serve governmental purposes, but to enable the members of the human family to have the understanding and knowledge of each other which is a foundation for durable peace. But after a generation of fanatic indoctrination, the Soviet rulers can hardly bring themselves to loosen their existing thought controls to permit of freer contacts with the free world.

On all these matters dealt with at Geneva we tried to negotiate seriously with the Soviet Union. We wanted to reach constructive agreements if that could be done. But we were not prepared to reach agreements at the expense of the aspirations or security of the United States or its partners. Neither were we willing to make so-called "agreements" which were really meaningless. So when

⁷ *Ibid.*, Nov. 14, 1955, p. 778.

⁸ For text of the Soviet proposal on East-West contacts, see *ibid.*, p. 779.

the Soviet Union showed itself unwilling to negotiate seriously on this basis we came away without agreement.

It would have been easy to make some apparent agreements with the Soviet Union—but they would have been without real content. They would have given an illusion of a meeting of minds, where none in fact existed. The three Western powers stood steadfastly against that kind of performance. In doing so, they showed their confidence in their own strength and in the steadfastness of their own people. Thereby, this conference may have improved the prospects for real agreements in the future.

Five Questions Answered

I now turn to the answers to the questions which I put at the beginning:

(1) *Does this second Geneva conference end the so-called "spirit of Geneva?"*

The answer to that question depends upon what is meant by the "spirit of Geneva." Some felt that the spirit of Geneva was some magic elixir which would of itself solve all of the great problems of the world. Obviously it was not that. Any such view was doomed to disillusionment.

That was never the view of the President nor myself. We constantly warned against that view. President Eisenhower, before he went to Geneva, said that that conference would be a beginning and not an end. At Geneva he said that the value of the conference could only be judged by what happened afterward. And after he returned he told the American people that the acid test of the summit conference would begin when the Foreign Ministers met.

That testing, so far as it has gone, has shown that the Soviet leaders would like to have at least the appearance of cooperative relations with the Western nations. But it has shown that they are not yet willing to create the indispensable conditions for a secure peace. Also they have seriously set back the growth of any confidence the free world can justifiably place in Soviet promises. They did this by refusing to negotiate for the reunification of Germany, to which they had agreed in July.

However, they seem not to want to revert to the earlier reliance on threats and invective. In that respect the spirit of Geneva still survives.

(2) *Has the outcome of the second conference at Geneva increased the risk of general war?*

President Eisenhower said that he believed that the summit conference made it less likely that there would be open war between our countries. Nothing that happened at the Foreign Ministers conference requires a change in that estimate. So that aspect of the Geneva spirit also remains.

(3) *Do the events of the last 3 weeks mean that the cold war will be resumed in its full vigor?*

The phrase "cold war" is a loose one.

Of course, there are sharp differences between the objectives of the Soviet Government and our own. We believe in justice for all and in the right of nations to be free and the right of individuals to exercise their God-given capacity to think and to believe in accordance with the dictates of their mind and conscience. We shall not cease to pursue these objectives or ever seek a so-called peace which compromises them.

However, these great purposes which have been characteristic of our Nation from its beginning can be and will be pursued by us without resort to violence or without resort to the use of hatred and perversion of truth which are characteristic of war. It is our purpose to continue to seek friendship and understanding with the Russian people as a whole and to use truth as the instrument of our national policy.

The "cold war" in the sense of peaceful competition will inevitably go on. The spirit of Geneva could not and did not change that fact. Moreover, we must assume that the Soviet Union will continue its efforts by means short of war to make its system prevail as it has done in the past. We can, however, hope that this competition will not entail all the same hostility and animosity which so defiled the relations between us in the past.

(4) *Will the United States now have radically to revise its programs for defense and mutual security?*

The answer to this is "No." We have not lowered our guard on the basis of Soviet promises and did not do so because of the summit conference. Our security programs, which are bipartisan in character, are designed to meet the peril as long as it may continue. We are on what we call a long-haul basis. Our military strength must be based on the capability of the Soviet bloc and cannot vary with their smiles or frowns. We will reduce our own military strength only as the Soviets demonstrably reduce their own. Hence the out-

come of the Geneva conference does not require us to alter the general scope of our programs. Their general order of magnitude can remain as planned.

Our steady policies have proved their worth. We believe in holding fast, and reinforcing, that which has proved good.

(5) *Does this last Geneva conference mean an end to future negotiation with the Soviet Union?*

It need not be an end and neither the President nor I believe that it will be an end. It would of course be foolish to attempt new negotiations if everything remains as it was when this last conference came to an end.

We know, however, that conditions will change because change is the law of life.

At this Geneva conference the Soviet Union had to face up concretely to the cost of achieving the larger results which it says it wants in terms of European security, disarmament, and increased contacts between East and West.

On this occasion no positive results were achieved. But I recall that President Eisenhower, after returning from Geneva, said that he was "profoundly impressed with the need for all of us to avoid discouragement merely because our own proposals, our own approaches, and our own beliefs are not always immediately accepted by the other side." And he pointed to the difficulty of bridging the wide and deep gulf between individual liberty and regimentation, and between the concept of man made in the image of God and the concept of man as the mere instrument of the state.

That gulf has created obstacles so great that they could not be overcome at this recent Geneva conference.

That does not mean that our efforts at that conference were wasted. The proposals we advanced were basically sound and respected the legitimate interest of all. When solutions come, they will have to take into account the principles which we sought to apply.

The Soviets pride themselves on being realists. They have shown in the past that they will adapt their policies to facts and realities once they recognize them. We believe that the free nations, by maintaining and strengthening their unity, can make it apparent to the Soviet Union that solutions such as we proposed are in its real interest and will benefit them more than the local and temporary advantages to which they now seem to attach overriding importance.

Of course the Soviets will not change their policies if they believe that the free world is going to fall apart. That is why continuation of the present partnership of the independent nations is indispensable to a peaceful solution of present problems.

It is vital that all free nations, including ourselves, clearly understand this basic truth.

I am happy to be able to make a good report about this partnership.

In Paris, before the Geneva conference, we had a useful session of the NATO Council. It was attended by virtually all of the Foreign Ministers of the 15 member countries. It served further to cement the unity represented by the Council.

While in Europe I also consulted with leaders of the movement to develop still further the unity of Europe. This movement is again becoming vigorous. In my talks I made clear that the initiative for further steps toward European integration must come from the Europeans themselves but that the United States stands ready and eager to help to realize this great idea.

I went to Spain, Italy, and Yugoslavia. In each place I had a full and helpful discussion of the international scene. The result was, I think, to create better understanding and firmer ties of friendship.

Finally, a most important fact is that at the Geneva conference there were the closest personal and working relations between the British Foreign Minister, Mr. Macmillan, and the French Foreign Minister, Mr. Pinay, and myself. We also worked closely with the representatives of the Federal Republic of Germany in matters that concerned it.

This spirit of fellowship, which fortified our common effort in a common cause, is one of the important products of the Geneva conference.

President Eisenhower's Views

The statement which I make to you tonight follows extended conference with President Eisenhower. He authorizes me to say that he fully shares the evaluation which I have made of the Geneva conference and of its impact upon our national policies. That evaluation stems from the President's ruling and life purpose for a fair, just, and durable peace for the world, a purpose which I share and which, with him, I strive to implement.

And now, in closing, let me read from my ver-

batim notes of our conference at Gettysburg this morning. As I was leaving, the President turned to me and said:

"I know that no setback, no obstacle to progress will ever deter this government and our people from the great effort to establish a just and durable

peace. Success may be long in coming, but there is no temporal force so capable of helping achieve it as the strength, the might, the spirit of 165 million free Americans. In striving toward this shining goal, this country will never admit defeat."

Foreign Ministers Conclude Conference at Geneva

Following are texts of statements made at Geneva by Secretary Dulles on disarmament and on East-West contacts; texts of proposals on the same subjects by the three Western powers and by the Soviet delegation; a closing statement by the Secretary; the final communique issued on November 16; and a tripartite declaration of the same date dealing with Germany and European security.

STATEMENT BY SECRETARY DULLES, NOVEMBER 11

U.S. delegation press release

I shall speak first with reference to the statements of the Soviet delegation regarding President Eisenhower's proposal for an exchange of military blueprints and reciprocal aerial reconnaissance.¹

The Soviet delegation says that "no doubt President Eisenhower was guided by the best of intentions." But the Soviet delegation concludes that, whereas President Eisenhower thought and said that his proposal would lessen danger and relax tension, the Soviet Union has come to the conclusion that it would work in exactly the opposite way and would increase danger and tension.

In essence, the Soviet Union says that, although President Eisenhower has good intentions, he has bad judgment regarding these matters of war and peace. With this conclusion we cannot agree, and we believe that most of the world will also not agree. It is not easy to disparage the judgment of one who won worldwide renown as the military leader of the great coalition which won the victory in the West for freedom.

¹ BULLETIN of Aug. 1, 1955, p. 174.

When President Eisenhower made his proposal to Chairman Bulganin, it was greeted with a wave of acclaim throughout the whole world. The people everywhere felt instinctively that his proposal, if accepted, would, for all practical purposes, mean an ending of the danger of war between our two countries.

I believe that the instinct of the people of the world was right. I do not think that they will be convinced to the contrary by the arguments which Mr. Molotov yesterday put forward. I shall take up these arguments one by one and comment on them.

1. It is said that the link between the Eisenhower proposal and disarmament is not clear. But, in fact, the proposal was made as a prelude to a program for a mutually dependable system for less armament.

2. The Soviet delegation points out that the Eisenhower proposal refers solely to the territory of the Soviet Union and of the United States and would not cover the forces of these two countries elsewhere, or the forces of our Allies.

It is quite true that both the Soviet Union and the United States have substantial military forces beyond their sovereign border. Certainly, the Government of the Soviet Union will not deny that it maintains substantial forces in East Germany, Poland, Hungary, Rumania, and other places and locations. However, the most important forces of both the Soviet Union and the United States are located within their sovereign borders.

The overwhelming portion of the forces that would be inevitably involved in an attack are located in both instances within the sovereign borders. This, then, is the place to begin. It is the place where a beginning can be made promptly

because it would not require the sovereign decision of many nations or raise the problems involved in negotiating agreements with some 40 to 50 other countries.

The Governments of France and the United Kingdom have already associated themselves with the Eisenhower proposal. Furthermore, if the Eisenhower proposal is accepted by the Soviet Union, the United States would be prepared to proceed promptly, so far as it is concerned, to negotiate both with other sovereign states involved and with the Soviet Union for the appropriate extension on a reciprocal, equitable basis of the Eisenhower proposal and the Bulganin control posts to overseas bases, and to the forces of other countries.

Of course, President Eisenhower realized that what he proposed here last July was only a beginning. I recall his exact words. He said, "what I propose, I assure you, would be but a beginning."

But it is the beginning, the initial breakthrough, that is often decisive. As President Eisenhower emphasized, the spirit of peace would more surely reign and further disarmament more surely be achieved if mutual understanding and reciprocal openness existed as between the two countries which have the greatest stockpiles of atomic weapons.

It is that moral aspect of President Eisenhower's proposal which the Soviet Union seems entirely to have missed.

3. In the third place, objection is made to what is called "enormous expenditures" which would be required to carry out aerial photography.

It is quite true that there would be considerable expense and that planes and technical facilities might have to be diverted from purposes of war to purposes of peace. The United States, I may say, is prepared to do that. I cannot believe that any country would really refuse to embark on a great project for peace because it required a diversion of resources from war.

4. It is further argued that President Eisenhower's proposal does not provide for "the setting up of control posts at ports, railway junctions," and so forth. I am surprised to hear this argument made after Chairman Bulganin has received President Eisenhower's letter of October 11,² in which President Eisenhower said:

I have not forgotten your proposal having to do with

² *Ibid.*, Oct. 24, 1955, p. 643.

stationing inspection teams at key points in our countries, and if you feel this would help to create the better spirit I refer to, we could accept that too.

5. Finally, it is argued that the Eisenhower plan would increase the risk of war because it would give countries information about the military installations of each other and thus enable an aggressor to make a more effective surprise attack.

I know that the Soviet Union has ample information about the United States and about our military and industrial dispositions. And the United States is not totally ignorant of the Soviet Union. Both of us, I surmise, know enough to attack. What is lacking is the deterrent to attack which would come if preparations for attack can be detected so that the aggressor does not have the benefit of surprise.

That is the way in which the Eisenhower proposal would work powerfully for peace.

Soviet Position on Aerial Photography

We do not ignore the fact that the Soviet Union, although rejecting President Eisenhower's proposal, as he made it, indicates that it would accept a concept of aerial photography as one of the forms of control to be considered, as the Soviet Union puts it, "at the concluding stage of the implementation of measures to reduce armaments and prohibit atomic weapons."

We accept this statement of the Soviet Union as a welcome advance over prior Soviet positions. We are, nevertheless, grievously disappointed that the Soviet Union now rejects President Eisenhower's proposal as a beginning step to lessen tension between our countries and open the path to further steps for inspection and control, and reduction of armament based thereon.

Perhaps, however, the Soviet delegation's statement of yesterday does not represent the last word of the Soviet Union.

I recall the initial negative reaction of the Soviet Union toward President Eisenhower's arms-for-peace proposal made in December 1953 before the United Nations. I also remember that by July 1955 the Soviet Union had come to accept in principle that proposal.

I still hope that there will be a similar evolution of Soviet thinking with reference to President Eisenhower's proposal for exchanges of blueprints and reciprocal aerial photography, although I hope that the time lapse will be shorter because time presses.

Soviets' Atomic Proposals

I turn now to the proposal introduced yesterday by the Soviet delegation on this topic of disarmament,³ a proposal which in the main is a duplication of prior proposals made on various occasions. I deal with this proposal myself only in so far as it deals with atomic matters. There are four items with reference to atomic matters.

One is that "as one of the first measures for the execution of the program for the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic weapons, states processing atomic and hydrogen weapons pledge themselves to discontinue tests of these weapons."

Let me say that, if agreement can be reached to eliminate or limit nuclear weapons under proper safeguards, the United States would be prepared to agree to corresponding restrictions on the testing of such weapons.

Then there are two rather similar items, one of which suggests that the four powers would pledge themselves "not to be the first to use atomic and hydrogen weapons," and the other of which suggests that they should "pledge themselves not to use nuclear weapons."

These suggestions are subject to the grave defect that they contemplate only promises.

It is basic in the United States policy not to allow its security to be dependent upon promises and agreements which may prove illusory. We had this week a grave disillusionment when we sought fulfillment of the Soviet agreement that Germany should be reunified by free elections.

It can hardly be expected that the United States would depend upon pledges which cannot be relied upon and for the performance of which no dependable controls are provided.

We further point out that if a war begins it will be because some nation has violated the solemn pledge contained in the charter of the United Nations, and found in many other international agreements, to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the charter. If a nation breaks that pledge, how can we assume that it will live up to its pledge not to use atomic weapons, or not to be the first to use them? The United States has agreed not to use force against the Soviet Union in violation of the charter of the United Nations. But if the Soviet Union does

not believe that we shall live by that pledge, why does it want more pledges? And vice versa?

Need for "Atmosphere of Trust"

With respect to the proposal that all atomic weapons shall be eliminated, I call attention to the powerful statement made by the Soviet Union in its May 10 proposals, to the effect that there can be no assurance of the elimination of atomic weapons. I should like to read from that statement:

There are possibilities beyond the reach of international control for evading this control and for organizing the clandestine manufacture of atomic and hydrogen weapons, even if there is a formal agreement on international control. In such a situation the security of the states signatory to the international convention cannot be guaranteed, since the possibility would be open to a potential aggressor to accumulate stocks of atomic and hydrogen weapons for a surprise atomic attack on peace-loving states.

Until an atmosphere of trust has been created in relations between states, any agreement on the institution of international control can only serve to lull the vigilance of the peoples. It will create a false sense of security, while in reality there will be a danger of the production of atomic and hydrogen weapons and hence the threat of surprise attack and the unleashing of an atomic war with all its appalling consequences for the people.

It is the danger so graphically portrayed by the Soviet Union that creates the problem with which we are all wrestling. It will, we assume, come again before the United Nations disarmament subcommittee. We here are obviously unable to solve that problem, nor are we prepared to anticipate what will be the conclusions of the scientific experts who are dealing with the matter.

It will be recalled that in the proposal which the three Western powers submitted yesterday⁴ we called for "continued scientific search by each state, with appropriate consultation between governments, for methods which might be derived from evolving scientific knowledge that would make possible a thoroughly effective inspection and control system of nuclear weapons material as part of a disarmament program covering all kinds of armaments."

It cannot reasonably be expected that we here shall agree to an elimination of nuclear weapons in the face of the difficulties and dangers to which the Soviet Union has itself directed our attention and which create a situation such that—in the words of the Soviet Union—we cannot be assured

³ *Ibid.*, Nov. 21, 1955, p. 832.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 831.

"until an atmosphere of trust has been created in relations between states." We can only regret that at this conference the position of the Soviet Union has brought no progress, but retrogression, as regards "an atmosphere of trust." It is more than ever inevitable that the United States should adhere closely to the position which President Eisenhower set forth in his address of July 25, 1955:

In the matter of disarmament, the American Government believes that an effective disarmament system can be reached only if at its base there is an effective reciprocal inspection and overall supervision system, one in which we can have confidence and each side can know that the other side is carrying out its commitments.

I have given the reasons why the United States cannot entertain disarmament proposals from the Soviet Union which are predicated upon mutual trust and confidence, which does not now exist. We urge that the Soviet Union realistically accept that fact and that through the United Nations disarmament subcommittee we develop as rapidly and as fully as possible an effective reciprocal inspection and overall supervision system. Then we would, indeed, have a basis for the reduction of armaments which we all want and which would enable the resources of the world more fully to be dedicated to the welfare of mankind.

SECOND STATEMENT BY SECRETARY DULLES, NOVEMBER 11

I would like to call attention to what seems to me to be a contradiction in the Soviet position which I would be glad to have Mr. Molotov reconcile if he can. The Soviet proposal of yesterday dealing with the level of forces and the prohibition of atomic and hydrogen weapons ends up by saying:

Effective international control shall be established over the implementation of measures for the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic weapons.

As I quoted Marshal Bulganin yesterday,⁵ he said:

Every disarmament scheme comes down to the question of control and inspection. This inspection problem is extremely serious and we must find a mutually acceptable solution for it.

Yet, the portion of the Soviet proposal of May

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 828.

10th, from which I read, points out explicitly that there are now "possibilities beyond the reach of international control" and that any agreement under present circumstances would be dangerous because it would only serve to lull the vigilance of the peoples. It will create a false sense of security when in reality there is danger.

I would like to know how the Soviet Union can make a proposal for prohibition of nuclear weapons which in words at least depends upon "effective international control" while at the same time the Soviet Union has said, and I think accurately said, that there is now no possibility of such effective international control and that to attempt to have such international control would be a danger.

If the Soviet proposal of yesterday, which is a duplicate of that which was submitted here last July, were to express itself accurately, paragraph 5 would read:

Effective international control cannot now be established over the implementation of measures for the prohibition of atomic weapons and the attempt to do so would be a grave danger.

When I consider what the Soviet Union said on May 10th, I cannot myself interpret that provision of the Soviet proposal of yesterday as being other than a cruel deception which is sought to be perpetrated on the peoples of the world for propaganda purposes.

THIRD STATEMENT BY SECRETARY DULLES, NOVEMBER 11

Mr. Chairman, I would like to spend a minute or two more on the point we have been discussing. The May 10 statement said, and I quote:

There are possibilities beyond the reach of international control for evading this control and for organizing the clandestine manufacture of atomic and hydrogen weapons, even if there is a formal agreement on international control. In such a situation the security of the states signatory to an international convention can not be guaranteed.

So I still do not see how to reconcile the statement that "there are possibilities beyond the reach of international control" with the statement in paragraph 5 of the Soviet proposal that "effective international controls shall be established over the prohibition of atomic weapons."

But I do not draw the conclusion that nothing can be done about limitation and reduction of armaments. I am satisfied that something can be done

and should be done. But the way to do it is not to pretend that something can be done which the Soviet Union knows full well and has stated very strongly cannot be done: that is, to establish at the present time effective international control over the possible manufacture of atomic weapons.

The problem is to find out what can be controlled and then control it; and that is the purpose of these proposals that have been made by President Eisenhower, by Prime Minister Edgar Faure, and by Prime Minister Eden, and indeed also by Marshal Bulganin, that we should explore the possibilities and find out what can be controlled. Then we can know what we can safely agree upon.

There is no use, I think, trying to press here for a type of agreement which cannot be supervised, because, as Mr. Molotov has said, there is not yet sufficient trust and confidence among us. Therefore, let us find out what it is that we can do, what we can control, and then let us proceed to disarm accordingly.

I am satisfied that if we are resourceful and ingenious and painstaking and patient, we will find that a lot of things can be controlled. It may be possible to control, if not "the clandestine manufacture of atomic and hydrogen weapons" which the Soviet Union says can't be controlled—but it may be possible to control the means of their delivery. And nobody, I suppose, is going to go to the trouble and expense of making these highly costly weapons if there is no way to use them or if attempts to use them would be so detected and exposed in advance that the attempted use would react against the aggressor.

There are, as I have suggested in my speech yesterday, possibilities of control in the case of those who have not yet developed a stockpile of weapons quantity and material.

Why can't we, if we are really sincere about this matter, get to work to discover by experiments what are the possibilities of control and inspection? Then we can really make some progress. But we can't make progress if on the one hand we admit that there are possibilities beyond the reach of international control for preventing the clandestine manufacture of atomic and hydrogen weapons, and then on the other hand insist on a program which assumes that there can be such control.

It is almost infamous, I think, to insinuate that the three Western powers here have no interest in disarmament and that we want to pile up great

military forces of all kinds, while the Soviet Union is the only country which wants to disarm. That is such a grotesque picture that I do not think that that type of propaganda is really effective. I believe that the world will judge, and rightly judge, that those who want to have effective disarmament will be those who want to explore the possibilities of control to see where we can have effective inspection and control in order that we can build soundly, safely, and surely for the limitation and reduction of armaments which every reasonable person knows we all want.

STATEMENT BY SECRETARY DULLES ON EAST-WEST CONTACTS, NOVEMBER 14

U.S. delegation press release

This item of East-West contacts, although last on our agenda, is not the least. For in the long run peace depends upon fellowship between the peoples of the world.

We believe that the human race is, by the Supreme Will which designed the natural order, a family. Its members differ in many respects; but they are alike in their inherent capacity to judge right and wrong, and they are akin through sympathy with each other's aspirations.

The great danger of war comes from the possibility that the human family may be artificially divided into hostile camps and that certain peoples may be brought to regard others as alien and hostile, when in fact that is not the case. Sometimes those in power find it profitable to promote this alienation of peoples. But that is a danger against which we should erect such bulwarks as are to be found in the free exchange of information and in the free movement of people.

We realize that free information is not always correct information and that those who travel do not always give or receive correct impressions. Nevertheless, the risks from such infirmities are infinitely less than the risk of allowing the thinking of one people about another to be determined by government controls.

The United States hoped that one of the good results to come from the Geneva conference of the Heads of Governments would be freer exchanges of ideas, of persons, and of goods.

This has happened to some degree. The United States has tried to help in that direction.

With respect to the exchange of ideas there was nothing that the United States could do unilaterally. Already our free press reports fully on developments within the Soviet bloc that are known to it. Important statements by Soviet rulers are widely reported by our press, radio, and television newscasts.

The only limitation is caused by Soviet censorship of news from the Soviet Union and the difficulty which reporters experience in getting access to the facts within the Soviet bloc. On our side there is no censorship or comparable restrictions.

With respect to the exchange of persons, the United States, as an earnest of its intentions, changed its passport regulations so that passports may be obtained valid for the Soviet Union and Eastern European countries with which we have diplomatic relations, just as our passports are valid for Western European countries.⁶

In the area of trade with the Soviet Union we have only a few prohibitions. In anticipation of this conference, and in order to facilitate trade further, we took steps to simplify export procedures.⁷

However, the developments at this conference have been disappointing.

Soviet Censorship

The exchange of information and ideas is blocked on the Soviet side by an all-embracing Soviet censorship of press and radio and the systematic Soviet jamming of radio broadcasts from other countries.

In the committee of experts, the Soviet representative maintained that these two obstacles—censorship and jamming—could not be admitted to the agenda for substantive consideration since they concerned internal affairs of the Soviet Union.

It can be argued that these matters are, indeed, internal ones, and it is true that only Soviet action can remove them. Nevertheless, the Soviet system of censorship, of which jamming is a part, is a basic and grave impediment to the free flow of information and ideas.

This censorship is exercised in such a way as to prevent the Soviet people from learning objective facts about the rest of the world. Knowledge of the true way of life of the non-Communist countries, including their eagerness to live in peace

and friendship with the Soviet peoples, has been suppressed. At the same time, it is impossible for the rest of the world to receive adequate reports about developments in the Soviet Union.

The failure of the Soviet delegation to indicate any willingness to take steps looking toward the progressive elimination of censorship is, consequently, extremely discouraging.

The Soviet delegation refused to consider Western suggestions for improvement in the treatment accorded to foreign journalists in the Soviet Union. The Soviet delegation also evaded a precise answer to the proposal of the Western powers for a regular exchange of uncensored broadcasts, responding only with vague pronouncements regarding the desirability of a general agreement for greater cooperation in the radio field.

We would welcome cooperation in radio communications. However, there is massive and systematic jamming of news broadcasts. Once this is eliminated, I am confident that we could reach general agreement on cooperation with regard to radio communications. This position was made clear in a note from the United States Government to the Soviet Union of December 1953.

On other items to which the Western delegations attach importance—items containing concrete proposals such as the establishment of reading rooms in the respective capitals, the publication and distribution in each other's countries of official periodicals, and the public sale of books and magazines—the Soviet delegation also refused to express agreement even in principle. These matters were consigned by the Soviet delegation to possible bilateral discussions at a later date.

Difficulties Regarding Exchange of Persons

With respect to movement of people, significant progress is blocked by the Soviet failure to respond to the Western proposals for less travel restrictions on foreigners and more normal treatment of diplomatic missions.

The committee of experts agreed in general on the desirability of exchanges of persons and of delegations, but even here many differences exist regarding the procedures and principles under which such exchanges should be conducted.

Exchanges of persons with the Soviet Union of necessity assume a different character than with countries of the free world. All travel abroad by Soviet citizens is carefully controlled by the So-

⁶ *Ibid.*, Nov. 14, 1955, p. 777.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 778.

viet Government and is undertaken only by carefully selected groups. Travel abroad therefore on the part of Soviet citizens is not what we would call ordinary travel by persons on business or pleasure.

Visits to foreign countries are an instrument of Soviet policy designed to bring certain specific advantages to the Soviet State, especially for the acquisition of technical know-how. These special features must be and are taken into consideration by the United States in its approach to this problem. It is for this reason that we seek to establish visits of this type on a basis of reciprocal advantage. They cannot be made haphazardly or on short notice but require a certain degree of planning and arrangement.

Negative Attitude on Transport and Trade

The experts' studies in the field of transport and trade have similarly been frustrated by the negative attitude of the Soviet delegation.

In the course of the working group meetings, the Western powers advanced four positive proposals:

1. That the Soviet Union agree that bilateral negotiations looking toward the early establishment of direct air links between the Soviet Union and the Western nations, under normal bilateral air transport agreements, should be undertaken as soon as possible.

2. That the Soviet Union take measures to alleviate the difficulties now encountered by Western businessmen in establishing adequate representation and in performing usual business and maintenance services within the Soviet Union.

3. That the Soviet Union accord more adequate protection to Western industrial property rights and copyrights, recognizing the generally accepted right of priority to new patents and agreeing to make data available concerning Soviet patents.

4. That the Soviet Union make available production, marketing, price, and trade data, comparable to such information now available to the Soviet Union from the Western countries.

Each of these modest proposals was designed to eliminate discernible obstacles now thwarting the exercise of Western initiative for the mutually beneficial development of peaceful East-West trade. Each of these proposals was ignored or summarily dismissed by the Soviet representatives.

France, the United Kingdom, and the United States made repeated requests that the Soviet Union indicate that it was now prepared itself to make the effort necessary to attain a substantially higher level of peaceful East-West trade. But the Soviet representatives made no positive response. Yet unless goods are made available from the Soviet Union and unless the Soviet Union takes concrete steps to open its market, unilateral willingness to trade on the part of the Western countries cannot convert itself into two-way trade.

In place of the positive response concerning peaceful trade which the United States had reason under the Heads of Government directive to expect from the Soviet Union, the Soviet representatives in the experts' committee confined their approach to an openly political attack upon the Western system of security controls over the exportation of a relatively small range of strategic commodities. It was precisely to avoid disputes and recriminations over these controls, and to direct attention to the vast problems of economic relationships between the East and the West, that the directive from the Heads of Government speaks of "peaceful" trade.

It was precisely to avoid wasting time over such distractions from the substance of our assignment that President Pinay, Mr. Macmillan, and I, in our opening remarks on item 3, before constituting the experts' committee, took the pains to point out that the strategic trade controls are a matter of security—are a consequence, not a cause, of tensions—and are outside the purview of item 3.⁸

Soviet officials conduct a strong propaganda outside their own country about their desire for trade and the alleged denial to them of trade opportunity. Yet the only restrictions which exist are those on strategic goods related to war purposes, touching only a very small percentage of normal international commerce.

Actually, the Soviet officials speak differently at home. There they explain to their own people that the countries of the Soviet bloc must pursue an autarchic policy of self-sufficiency. Earlier this year Mr. Molotov, speaking before the Supreme Soviet, called attention to the existence of two parallel world markets, which he said were opposed to each other.

We had hoped for a change in policy but thus

⁸ For the Secretary's opening remarks on item 3, see *ibid.*, p. 775.

far we have hoped in vain. The discussions of the experts concerning measures to expand peaceful trade have produced no basis of agreement for the simple, now unmistakably evident reason that the Soviet Union remains basically opposed to developing a high level of trade between East and West.

The fact is that the economic policies pursued by the Soviet Union and directed toward insuring the greatest degree of self-sufficiency leave for export no important stocks of consumer and other goods which normally enter into international trade. This consequence of Soviet economic policy, and not the small percentage of goods covered by strategic controls, has been and remains the chief limitation on any important development of trade with the Soviet Union.

Export of Surplus Arms

The Soviet Union apparently at the present time does, however, have large stockpiles of discarded arms resulting from the production of new models for the Soviets' own use. It would be a matter of utmost concern to the other nations of the world if the Soviet bloc should try to meet its large import needs and serve its other aims by exporting these surplus arms throughout the world. This is indeed something very different from the "peaceful trade between peoples" which the Heads of Government said we should seek to develop.

As a result of my review of the work of the experts, it seems clear that the Soviet Union is not at present disposed to take those important steps which lie within its power to promote the free circulation of information and ideas and to facilitate trade in peaceful goods.

The lack of progress on item 3 should not, I suppose, come as a surprise. It is confirmation of the fact that the Soviet bloc system is based upon artificial conditions which cannot withstand free contact with the outer world.

The Soviet rulers seem to fear lest their system would be endangered if the Soviet people had the kind of information which is available elsewhere; if they were free to join the many millions who constantly travel back and forth to get acquainted with each other; and if trade in consumer goods should bring to the Russian people knowledge of the immense quantity and superb quality of goods which are produced by societies where labor is free.

We do not believe that peace will have a solid foundation until there comes about free communications and peaceful trade between the Soviet bloc and the free Western peoples.

We cannot expect this to happen all at once. Indeed, our directive calls for a "progressive elimination of barriers." It does not require that barriers should be pulled down all at once. We had felt that our proposals were modest, and we greatly regret that virtually none of them has been accepted.

It would, of course, be possible for us to say that we here had in a general way reaffirmed the desirability of increased contacts. But merely to reaffirm is not our task. It is our task to formulate the measures which could realize the principles which our Heads of Government set forth. Therefore for us merely to reaffirm in generalities would only gloss over our lack of common accord on the important questions we have been asked to consider.

Therefore, it appears far preferable to state frankly that little has been achieved here to eliminate barriers and that basic impediments to freer contacts between East and West still exist and that we are far from achieving in practice the objectives set forth in the directive from the Heads of Government.

This is a disappointing conclusion, but the future is apt to be better if we face up now to what are the indisputable facts.

Nevertheless, we need not be disheartened. Since the summit meeting last July some progress has been made. Some barriers have in fact been lowered. We believe that the process thus begun cannot easily be reversed. Perhaps it will proceed more surely through a living process than by dependence upon negotiation. The United States does not intend to slacken its efforts to make communication more free and thus to end a situation that is dangerous to peace because it sets off one great part of the world as against another.

I have often expressed the friendship of the American people for the Russian people. Our countries have never been at war. Our people have never fought each other. And we do not believe that we could ever be brought to fight each other if only we know each other. The great danger comes from the carrying on year after year of a persistent campaign which distorts the mind of the Russian people.

That is the danger which the Heads of our Governments directed us to avert. I believe that the

talks which have occurred here, even though they have not resulted in any substantial agreements, at least may help us in the future to find the way to make our peace more solid.

STATEMENT BY SECRETARY DULLES, NOVEMBER 15

U.S. delegation press release

Yesterday, the French delegation submitted a proposal⁹ which, after study, the United States was ready to accept had it been accepted by the Soviet delegation. Apparently, however, that French proposal is now rejected by the Soviet delegation.

The Soviet delegation has now submitted a proposed draft statement by the four powers, which I have studied during the brief recess we have had. I regret to be forced to the conclusion that this present Soviet proposal does not adequately meet the directive under which we are acting, primarily in that it contains nothing, or practically nothing, designed to permit of an exchange of ideas and of information.

It will be recalled that President Eisenhower in his statement here on July 22 on this topic¹⁰ put first of all the importance, as he put it:

(1) To lower the barriers which now impede the interchange of information and ideas between our peoples.

The Soviet proposal does not seem to make any effort at all to meet the views of the Western powers with respect to the importance of free communication in the realm of information and ideas.

In view of the rejection by the Soviet Union of the French proposal, I have compared the present Soviet proposal with that which the three Western powers introduced on October 31 through the medium of the French delegation.

Item 1 of that proposal contemplated a freer exchange of information and ideas and a progressive elimination of censorship. That is rejected.

Item 2 proposed to have information centers on a basis of reciprocity which the people could freely use. That is rejected.

Item 3 proposed to permit the publication and facilitate the distribution of official periodicals. That is rejected.

⁹ Not printed here.

¹⁰ BULLETIN of Aug. 1, 1955, p. 174.

Item 4 dealt with exchange of books. It is accepted insofar as it relates to the exchange. But the vital part, which dealt with making these books available for public sale, is rejected.

Item 5, with reference to the exchange of government publications and full lists, catalogs, and indices, also seems to be rejected.

Item 6, dealing with the exchange of films at normal commercial prices and on normal terms, seems to be rejected, subject to the possibility that there might hereafter be an agreement on this topic.

Item 8, dealing with the reduction of jamming of news and information broadcasts, is rejected.

Item 9, with reference to exchanging uncensored broadcasts, appears also to be rejected, although it is suggested that there might hereafter be an agreement covering broadcast exchanges.

Item 10, dealing with the elimination of the censorship of outgoing press despatches and access by journalists to normal sources of information, is rejected.

Item 11 relates to tourism. There is a reference in the Soviet paper to tourism, but the Soviet Union rejects any suggestion that there should, to facilitate this, be reasonable rates of currency exchange.

Item 16, dealing with the restriction on the travel by members of the diplomatic missions on a basis of reciprocity, also is rejected.

Item 17, dealing with reciprocal exchanges of direct air transport services, is rejected.

In other words, of our 17 concrete proposals only five seem to be partially accepted. I emphasize that all of those which relate to a freer exchange of ideas, news, uncensored information have been rejected. The Soviet Union seems to have picked out of our proposal only four or five suggestions which it deems to its interest, and to have rejected all the others, without any spirit of give and take and with a complete omission of anything of substance in the realm of exchange of ideas.

I pointed out in my remarks yesterday that we consider that peace is not solidly based unless the peoples of the different countries can have access to what other peoples believe and, I think, that to base peace upon the power of government to dictate what peoples shall think about each other is, in our opinion, a very dangerous condition. And because the Soviet paper would perpetuate

what we deem to be a very great danger to peace and good understanding between peoples, and because it does not seem to us to comply with the directive which guides us, we do not find it acceptable.

SECOND STATEMENT BY SECRETARY DULLES, NOVEMBER 15

U.S. delegation press release

Mr. Molotov has made many statements which are frivolous and which, if time permitted, I would enjoy replying to in a similar vein. I will forego that pleasure.

I cannot, however, overlook a very serious charge which he makes, which is the charge that the Western powers deliberately formulated their proposals in bad faith with a view to bringing about their rejection. I had thought that that was not the kind of charge which would be lightly made in the atmosphere which our Heads of Government tried to create at Geneva. That is a charge which I reject in the most categorical manner.

Ever since the July conference at Geneva, the various agencies of the Government of the United States have been working in the most intense and careful manner in order to prepare for this conference and to make proposals which we believed would be acceptable.

It would not have taken months of work by hundreds of people to produce proposals which were designed to be rejected, and I resent very much the allegation that we have been acting in this matter in bad faith.

It is quite true that a large part of the proposals we made related to a freer exchange of ideas. We realize full well that ideas which flow freely never accord fully with the ideas of any government. The ideas about communism which are freely spread in the United States do not conform with the ideas of our Government, but we believe, as indeed do all of the free countries, that it is more healthy, more conducive to peace, to permit freedom of ideas rather than to attempt to have governmental regimentation of ideas.

We had thought that socialism was fully established within the Soviet Union so that it would not topple if perchance some contradictory ideas found their way into the Soviet Union. But, apparently, socialism is not as strongly established

in the Soviet Union as we had thought, and we must reconcile ourselves, I suppose, to the position now taken by the representative of the Soviet Union, that is, that it is dangerous to the Soviet Government to have in the Soviet Union any ideas which do not conform precisely to those of the Soviet Government. That nervousness and fear of the Soviet Government for its own future is something we will have to take into account and evaluate when we consider the possibility of further contacts.

I do not believe that our lack of agreement here will prevent the gradual development of contacts, although certainly they will not develop as rapidly as we had hoped when we came here. When I spoke here yesterday, I noted the fact that since the July meeting some actual progress had been made in the reduction of barriers.

The United States itself, on the opening day of this conference, took two actions: one in relation to passports and the other in relation to trade licenses, which did involve a reduction of barriers. Mr. Molotov has not thought that that was important enough to mention. However, we did it and we did not do it merely to get thanks from Mr. Molotov; so we can survive that omission.

I went on to say, in the statement I refer to, that I thought this process of increased contacts may proceed more surely as a living process than by dependence upon negotiation. I added that the United States did not intend to slacken its efforts to make communication more free and thus to end a situation which is dangerous to peace because it sets off one great part of the world as against another.

That note, upon which I ended yesterday, is the same note upon which I would end today.

SOVIET DRAFT STATEMENT ON EAST-WEST CONTACTS, NOVEMBER 15

[Unofficial translation]

Being guided by the interests of the strengthening of peace, creating an atmosphere of confidence and the development of cooperation among nations, the Foreign Ministers, in conformity with the directives of the Heads of Government of the Soviet Union, the United States, the French Republic and the United Kingdom, have studied "measures, including those possible in organs and agencies of the United Nations, which could (a) bring about a progressive elimination of barriers which interfere with free communications and peaceful trade between people

and (b) bring about such freer contacts and exchanges as are to the mutual advantage of the countries and peoples concerned."

A. Proceeding from the directives and realizing the importance of the problems which the committee of experts was instructed to study, the Foreign Ministers of the Four Powers have agreed to recommend their respective Governments:

To create conditions favorable for the development of peaceful trade and for this purpose to take measures designed to eliminate the existing obstacles and restrictions in the trade between East and West in order that merchants and trade organizations may use more freely the opportunities offered to them by the exchange between East and West.

To take measures in their power to facilitate the free passage of merchant ships of all countries through straits and canals of international importance and to remove existing restrictions on sea communications with certain states.

To facilitate the exchange of books, newspapers, scientific magazines, documentary and other films, as well as radio broadcasts, in accordance with agreements which may be of bilateral or multilateral nature.

B. The Foreign Ministers of the Four Powers are of the opinion that it is desirable to make easier and broader the relations between East and West in the following fields:

(a) Cultural exchange, in particular in the publishing field, and also exchange of cultural delegations, exhibitions, and so forth.

(b) Scientific and technical exchange; the participation of scientists in international congresses.

(c) Visits of representatives of industry, agriculture and trade.

(d) Exchange between professional, scientific, technical and artistic organizations.

(e) Exchange both of professors and students and of lecturers.

(f) Exchange of sportsmen and sports teams.

(g) Development of tourism, both collective and individual.

The four Governments, for the purpose of the further development of existing contacts, may determine, if necessary, the methods of such exchanges. The latter should be practiced under the most objective and effective conditions to the mutual advantage of countries signatory to the arrangements.

C. The Foreign Ministers of the Four Powers are of the opinion that there are a number of concrete problems pertaining to the development of contacts between East and West which are subject to examination directly by the countries concerned with cognizance of interests and legal norms of the respective states.

D. In accordance with the directives of the Heads of Government the Foreign Ministers of the Four Powers state that it would be desirable to take into account the contribution which the organs and agencies of the United Nations could make in conformity with the principles of the United Nations Charter in the effectuation of measures examined by this conference.

The four Ministers declare themselves in favor of the participation in international specialized agencies (ILO, UNESCO, WHO, ITU, and others) of all states desiring to cooperate in the work of these organizations.

TRIPARTITE DRAFT STATEMENT ON DISARMAMENT¹¹

Guided by the desire to contribute to lessening international tension, strengthening confidence between states and reducing the burden of armaments.

The Foreign Ministers of the Soviet Union, the United States of America, the United Kingdom and the French Republic remain convinced of the need to continue to seek agreement on a comprehensive program for disarmament which will promote international peace and security with the least diversion for armament of the world's human and economic resources.

Their discussions showed that, while there was agreement on this objective, it was not yet possible to reach agreement on effective methods and safeguards for achieving it.

The Ministers will transmit the record of these discussions to their representatives on the United Nations Disarmament Subcommittee. They believe that their exchange of views has been useful in clarifying their respective positions and should assist the Subcommittee in its efforts to reach agreement, as their representatives continue to carry out the directive of the Heads of Government, taking into account the proposals made at the July conference.

In the meantime the Ministers agree that the studies of methods of control which are now proceeding in different countries should be designed to facilitate a settlement of the disarmament problem.

The Ministers further reaffirmed the obligation of their governments to refrain from the use of force in any manner inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations.

SOVIET DRAFT DISARMAMENT DECLARATION¹²

Being guided by the desire to facilitate the lessening of international tension, strengthening confidence among states, eliminating the threat of war and reducing the burden of armaments,

The Foreign Ministers of the Soviet Union, the United States of America, the United Kingdom and the French Republic remain convinced of the need to continue to seek agreement on a comprehensive program for disarmament which would promote international peace and security with the least diversion for armament of the world's human and economic resources.

¹¹ Drafted jointly by the U.S., U.K., and French delegations and released to the press on Nov. 15; not submitted to the conference.

¹² Released to the press by the Soviet delegation on Nov. 15; not submitted to the conference.

Their discussions have shown that there is agreement on this objective and that on certain important questions pertaining to the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic weapons, including the need to institute effective control, the positions of the four powers have come closer together.

As to the questions on which agreement has not yet been achieved the Ministers have agreed that the four powers, together with other states concerned, shall exert their efforts to eliminate the present differences and thus work out an acceptable system of disarmament, which would include the reduction of all armaments and armed forces with effective guarantees.

At the same time the Ministers agreed that the studies of methods of control over the implementation by the states of their obligations on disarmament, which are now proceeding in various countries, should be designed to facilitate the settlement of the disarmament problem.

The Ministers have agreed that in this connection it is necessary, in accordance with the directive of the Heads of Government, to continue the consideration first of all of the provisions which are contained:

(a) in the Soviet proposals of May 10 and July 21 of this year on the reduction of armaments, the prohibition of atomic weapons and the elimination of the threat of another war,

(b) in the proposal of the President of the United States of July 21 on aerial photography and exchange of military information,

(c) in the proposals of the Government of the United Kingdom of July 21 and Aug. 29 on disarmament, and

(d) in the proposal of the Government of France on financial control over disarmament and on conversion to peaceful aims of the resources thus released.

The Ministers also state that there has been found full accord that the four powers, in conformity with the statements made by their Heads of Government, shall refrain from the use of armed force in the relations among them and shall seek the peaceful settlement of disputes which exist or may arise among them.

CLOSING STATEMENT BY SECRETARY DULLES, NOVEMBER 16

U.S. delegation press release

We must all feel the seriousness of this moment as our conference draws to an end.

We came here carrying a heavy responsibility. Last July the Heads of our Governments met and agreed to make a new effort to solve some of the stubborn problems which have long defied solution—the problem of Germany, the problem of disarmament, and the problem of breaking down the barriers which separate the Soviet bloc from the free world. They gave to us, the Foreign

Ministers, the task of attempting to translate their purposes into concrete realities.

The United States undertook, with the utmost seriousness, its share of the common task. We dedicated immense effort to preparation for this conference. I know that the Governments of France and the United Kingdom and, so far as it was concerned, the Federal Republic of Germany also made similar efforts. All this involved work of unprecedented intensity between the close of the July conference of Heads of Government and the opening in October of this Conference of Foreign Ministers.

We brought here the results of that preparatory work, and we have presented them, not as rigid positions but as bases for negotiation. There is, however, little agreement to record, as our communiqué makes plain.

European Security and Germany

The first item of our agenda involved the problem of European security and Germany. The three Western powers came forward with proposals both for European security and for the reunification of Germany—two problems which the four Heads of Government agreed were closely linked.

Our proposals for European security involved a great effort to give the Soviet Union assurance that its security would not be impaired if Germany should be reunified. Special safeguards were proposed to reassure the Soviet Union if reunified Germany, in the exercise of its inherent right of collective self-defense, should elect to associate itself with the North Atlantic Treaty and the Brussels Treaty Organizations.

The merit of our security proposals is demonstrated by the fact that the Soviet Union seemed to find in them much with which to agree. It has been made apparent that security is not the primary reason why the Soviet Union does not agree to the reunification of Germany. That is an important demonstration, and it may be helpful for the future.

However, the indispensable premise of our security proposal was the reunification of Germany, without which we feel there can be no solid peace in Europe. And the Soviet Union made no effort whatsoever to meet this point or to comply with that portion of our directive which called for the reunification of Germany by free elections.

November 28, 1955

The Soviet delegation refused to discuss the provisions of our reunification proposal, and it never submitted a reunification proposal of its own. It pointed to alleged obstacles to German reunification such as the existence of NATO and the Western European Union. But it never said that it would permit the reunification of Germany even if these alleged obstacles were done away with.

Rather, it took the position that it would not permit the so-called "German Democratic Republic," the regime which the Soviet Government has installed in East Germany, to be subjected to the test of free elections.

Significance of Soviet Refusal

The Soviet refusal even to contemplate free elections in East Germany has a significance which goes far beyond the confines of Germany. It highlights, as no words could, the situation throughout Eastern Europe.

If the so-called "German Democratic Republic" cannot stand the test of the people's choice, no more can the regimes imposed on the other peoples of Eastern Europe. This topic was not on our agenda because the Soviet Government had refused to accept it there. But we were all conscious of the fact that Soviet preoccupation with its problems in Eastern Europe weighed heavily upon it at this conference.

Last July, Chairman Bulganin agreed that there was a close link between German reunification and European security, that the four powers had a responsibility for the reunification of Germany, and that Germany should be reunified by free elections. The Government and people of the United States will find it hard to understand why, in the light of this, Chairman Bulganin sent to this Foreign Ministers conference a delegation which was apparently under orders not to discuss seriously the matter of German reunification.

Conditions in Eastern Europe may be such that the Soviet Union feels that it cannot now agree to free elections in any area it controls because that would have a contagious effect. But we think it unfortunate that this was not foreseen by the Soviet Government before it agreed at the highest level and under the most solemn circumstances that Germany should be reunified by free elections.

The attitude of the Soviet Government here will almost certainly impair the development of confidence which the summit meeting sought to foster.

Disarmament

The second item of our directive was disarmament. In this matter primary responsibility was not given to this Foreign Ministers conference. The Heads of Government agreed last July to work together through the subcommittee of the United Nations Disarmament Commission to develop an acceptable system for disarmament. The Foreign Ministers here were given what might be called a watching and supporting role.

Nevertheless, I believe that our discussions on disarmament have been useful. I hope they have led the Soviet delegation to realize the sincerity of the United States purpose. We have made it clear that we are determined to seek reduction of armament, but we want reduction that can be checked and controlled, so that it will not be one-sided. President Eisenhower's proposal for exchange of blueprints and aerial inspection was presented as a start toward that goal.

The Soviet Union has suggested the giving of pledges not to wage an atomic war. We pointed out that the four of us here, and indeed most of the nations of the world, are already pledged not to wage any war in violation of the charter of the United Nations.

The great weight of world opinion and the potency of moral judgment should be directed against the initiation of *any* war and not merely wars with particular weapons. Any war is horrible. And any government which defied world opinion by going to war in violation of its previous solemn pledges could not be relied upon to keep its new pledge not to use atomic weapons.

Therefore, in the case of atomic as of other weapons, the primary task is to find means of supervision and control. Pledges alone are not enough.

We believe that the Western point of view in these respects is now better understood and that the representatives of the four of us, with Canada, on the subcommittee of the United Nations Disarmament Commission will accordingly now be able more effectively to carry on their work. The agreement of the four Heads of Government to work through that subcommittee is, of course, unchanged by anything we have done here.

Development of Contacts

Item 3 of our agenda dealt with the development of contacts. Here, again, there is no agreement to record. It is apparent that there has been little change in the sensitiveness of the Soviet Government to the introduction into the Soviet Union of any ideas which conflict with the official ideology.

The free democracies believe that human beings were given minds with which to think and consciences with which to judge right and wrong, and that human dignity requires freedom of thought and freedom of conscience. We also believe that the peoples of the world are essentially a single family, the members of which are naturally sympathetic with each other. Therefore, we believe that peace and human dignity are best served by allowing ideas, knowledge, and news to be freely exchanged.

We did not expect this to happen all at once so far as the Soviet bloc is concerned. Indeed, our directive contemplates that the barriers which interfere with free communications shall be eliminated only gradually and not abruptly. Recognizing this, we made only modest proposals which we believed the Soviet Government could accept.

However, no concrete proposal made by the Western powers for the elimination of barriers to the free exchange of ideas and information between our peoples was acceptable to the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union was primarily interested in contacts which might enable it to obtain valuable technological information or to enable it to obtain strategic goods rather than the commodities of peaceful trade which our directive specifies.

The talks here of our experts have for the first time brought many new vistas into the realm of practical discussion. No agreements have been reached, but I think that the efforts made will not die.

I expect that each of our Governments will act in these matters in terms of particular items and in terms of its judgment as to whether to reduce barriers is in its national interest. But one element in that decision is bound to be the eagerness of the people to know more about each other and to learn of new ideas.

Since the July summit conference certain barriers to communication have, in fact, been eliminated. The process now started is almost sure to go on. It may proceed only slowly and unevenly,

but the process now started is, we believe, not easily reversed.

Hasty Solutions Not Expected

International conferences rarely produce as much as people hope from them. We should not complain that hopes are high because the existence of those hopes inspires us to do our best. Having myself lived through more conferences than are the lot of most human beings, I have learned not to be readily discouraged.

I recall that the three Western powers took the initiative which led to the Heads of Government conference. They pointed out in their note to the Soviet Union of May 10, 1955:¹³

We recognize that the solution of these problems will take time and patience. They will not be solved at a single meeting nor in a hasty manner.

And I recall that President Eisenhower on his return from the summit conference said that he was

profoundly impressed with the need for all of us to avoid discouragement merely because our own proposals, our own approaches, and our own beliefs are not always immediately accepted by the other side.

This conference has had its merits. We have talked plainly. We have in the main discussed seriously and without vituperation. Our talks have not been wholly barren.

The Government and the people of the United States want to develop better relations with the Soviet nation. Our hope for the future derives from our belief that the Soviet Government will, sooner or later, come to see that the advantage to it in better relations with the West is far greater than the local and passing advantages which it could gain at the price of forfeiting the good relationship which, at the summit conference, the Soviet rulers seemed to want.

On my return to the United States, I shall report to President Eisenhower. He has closely followed this conference on a day-to-day basis and will evaluate its result against the background of his vast knowledge and abhorrence of war and his dedication to the cause of a just and durable peace.

I am confident that our national policy will continue to find the way to serve the cause of human

¹³ BULLETIN of May 23, 1955, p. 832.

dignity, as represented by the freedom of individuals to exchange ideas; the cause of humanity, as represented by control of disarmament; and the cause of justice, as represented by the unification of Germany.

TEXT OF FINAL COMMUNIQUE, NOVEMBER 16

In compliance with the Directive issued by the four Heads of Government after their meeting in Geneva in July, the Foreign Ministers of the French Republic, the United Kingdom, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America met in Geneva from October 27 to November 16, 1955. They had a frank and comprehensive discussion of the three items entrusted to them in the Directive, namely: 1. European Security and Germany, 2. Disarmament, and 3. Development of Contacts between East and West.

The Foreign Ministers agreed to report the result of their discussions to their respective Heads of Government and to recommend that the future course of the discussions of the Foreign Ministers should be settled through diplomatic channels.

TRIPARTITE DECLARATION ON GERMANY AND EUROPEAN SECURITY

Press release 649 dated November 16

Following is the text of a joint declaration by the Foreign Ministers of the United States, United Kingdom, and France on Germany and European security issued at the close of the Geneva Conference at Geneva on November 16.¹⁴

At Geneva, the Foreign Ministers of France, the United Kingdom and the United States of America tried to reach agreement with the Soviet Foreign Minister on what the four Heads of Government in July agreed were the closely linked problems of German reunification and European security. To this end they made a proposal for the reunification of Germany by free elections in 1956 and for a Treaty of Assurance giving the

¹⁴ On the same date the U.S., British, and French Ambassadors at Bonn transmitted the declaration to the Foreign Minister of the Federal Republic of Germany, and U.S. Ambassador James B. Conant transmitted it to the Governing Mayor of Berlin.

Soviet Union far-reaching safeguards against aggression when Germany was reunified.¹⁵

Marshal Bulganin in July had agreed that the reunification of Germany was the common responsibility of the Four Powers and should be carried out by means of free elections. The Soviet Foreign Minister, however, despite the Directive of the Heads of Government, made it plain that the Soviet Government refused to agree to the reunification of Germany since that would lead to the liquidation of the East German regime. He made counter proposals¹⁶ which would have involved the continued division of Germany as well as the eventual dissolution of the Western security system. It is for this reason that the negotiations have failed.

The Foreign Ministers of France, the United Kingdom and the United States of America are aware that this result must bring a sense of cruel disappointment to the German people, East and West of the zonal border which now unjustly divides them. However, the three Foreign Ministers believe that the Soviet Government will come to recognize that its own self-interest will be served by ending the injustice of a divided Germany. They believe that the Soviet Government will realize that so long as it persists in withholding unity from the German people, thus perpetuating the division of Europe, there can be no solid security in Europe, nor indeed in the world.

The three Western Powers will themselves not cease their efforts to end the injustice and wrong now being done by dividing the German people and will continue to stand ready to contribute to the security which can be enjoyed by all only when Germany is reunified.

Commerce Department Pamphlet on Establishing a Business in Germany

The Bureau of Foreign Commerce of the U.S. Department of Commerce announced on November 16 the release of a new pamphlet containing information for U.S. businessmen interested in investing, trading, or setting up a business in the Federal Republic of Germany.

¹⁵ For the text of tripartite proposal, see *ibid.*, Nov. 7, 1955, p. 729.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, Nov. 7, 1955, p. 732, and Nov. 14, 1955, p. 783.

Entitled *Establishing a Business in the Federal Republic of Germany and Western Berlin*, the bulletin summarizes the German corporate and income tax structure and describes regulations on tax liability of foreign enterprises, entry and repatriation of capital, exchange controls, as well as foreign capital investment and transfer of earnings.

Laws governing establishment of business organizations such as single ownership, partnership, corporation, or limited liability company, branches, agencies, and subsidiaries are discussed, and a section on industrial property rights explains the Federal Republic's regulations covering patents, trademarks, and copyrights. In addition, the pamphlet contains basic information on employment and labor legislation.

Published as No. 55-96 in Economic Reports, Part 1 of the World Trade Information Service, the 16-page bulletin is available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D.C., or from any Department of Commerce Field Office, at 10 cents a copy.

Granting of Paroles to German War Criminals

Because of continued queries concerning recent paroles of war criminals by the Mixed Board, the following facts were made available to the press by the American Embassy, Bonn, and the U.S. Army Europe, Heidelberg, on November 2.

U.S. Embassy (Bonn) press release 55

The Mixed Board was established under article 6, Chapter One, of the Convention on the Settlement of Matters Arising Out of the War and the Occupation, of May 26, 1952, as amended by the Paris Protocol of October 23, 1954.¹ Article 6 provides that the Board should consist of six members: three from the Federal Republic of Germany and one each from France, Great Britain, and the United States. It is also provided under article 6 that "a unanimous recommendation of the

Board shall be binding upon the Power which imposed the sentence."

The action of the Mixed Board in granting paroles to war criminals is based on standard legal procedures, which means that deciding whether or not to recommend parole, the Board considers, generally, such factors as (1) the behavior, attitude, and work record of the applicant during confinement; (2) factors bearing on rehabilitation and the probability of the successful adjustment of the applicant in society; (3) the age, physical, and mental condition of the applicant; (4) the applicant's opportunities for employment and possibility of support so that he shall not become a charge of the community.

Under the established procedures of the Mixed Board, no information concerning its proceedings, deliberation, or finding in a particular case can be made public.

Parole does not change the sentence. It merely transfers the parolee from prison to the outside under most definite restrictions. These conditions provide, among other things, that the parolee must report regularly to the parole officer, must not publicize his case or commit acts hostile to the Allies or the Federal Republic of Germany, must not engage in political activity, must not change his residence or employment without the approval of the parole officer, and must remain within a restricted parole area. All parolees on war criminal parole status are subject to supervision by a German parole supervisor who in turn reports to the U.S. parole officer.

In the case of Sepp Dietrich, parole was recommended by a unanimous decision of the Mixed Board. Since Dietrich was convicted by a U.S. Army Court, it devolved upon General McAuliffe, as Chief of USAREUR, to take action. In view of the unanimous decision of the Board and the requirement of paragraph 3b of article 6 of the Settlement Convention, General McAuliffe had no choice but to parole Dietrich.

Dietrich's life term was reduced to 25 years on August 10, 1951. Since this term was commenced on May 9, 1945, Dietrich has been eligible for parole since September 9, 1953. He is eligible for a good-conduct release in February 1962.

Dietrich was released only after he had agreed to definite, restrictive parole conditions. Any violation of these parole conditions will mean revocation of his parole and his return to prison.

¹ For a summary of the convention, see BULLETIN of June 9, 1952, p. 890.

Visas for Archbishop Boris and Secretary Canceled

Press release 647 dated November 15

The Department of State on June 28, 1955, released the text of a note delivered June 27, 1955, by the American Embassy at Moscow to the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs protesting the expulsion from the U.S.S.R. of the Reverend Georges Bissonnette, a member of the Assumptionist Order.¹ This note refuted the Soviet Government's claim that our refusal to extend indefinitely the U.S. visa issued to Soviet Archbishop Boris constituted a violation of the terms of the November 16, 1933, Roosevelt-Litvinov agreement, which established diplomatic relations between the two countries and which provides for the presence of American clergymen in the Soviet Union to minister to the spiritual needs of American nationals. Nevertheless, the United States Government in this note stated:

If the Soviet Government now considers it desirable that Soviet clergymen be admitted to the United States in order to minister to the religious needs of Soviet nationals, the United States Government is prepared in the interest of reciprocity to extend to a Soviet clergyman the same possibilities of entry and religious activity as those accorded to American clergymen in the Soviet Union under the terms of the November 16, 1933 agreement.

The Embassy's note of June 27, 1955, pointed out the sharp contrast between the functions of an American priest ministering to American Catholics in the U.S.S.R. and the functions of a Soviet archbishop heading an American church organization in the United States, and requested that Father Bissonnette's appointed successor, Father Louis Dion, be granted the Soviet visa for which he had applied on March 23, 1955.

No direct reply was made by the Soviet Government to our note of June 27, 1955, and its voluntary offer of reciprocity permitting a Soviet clergyman to attend to the religious needs of Soviet nationals in the United States. On September

8, 1955, the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs requested our Embassy to issue unlimited visas to Archbishop Boris and his secretary, and Father Dion was advised by the Soviet Embassy in Washington that it was prepared to issue him a Soviet visa. A request by our Embassy on September 14, 1955, to be informed if by its action of September 8 the Soviet Government was accepting the basis set forth in our June 27 note relative to the permissible activity of a Soviet clergyman in the United States elicited no Soviet response.

In the absence of such response and following Father Dion's acceptance of a Soviet visa, the American Embassy in Moscow was instructed to issue U.S. visas to the Archbishop and his secretary, emphasizing at that time that these visas were being issued on the understanding that the Archbishop's functions in the United States would not exceed those permitted Father Dion in Moscow. This action was undertaken November 4, 1955.²

From the text of a Soviet response of November 10, 1955,³ it is apparent that the Soviet Government continues to insist that the admission of Father Dion to tend the spiritual needs of a few American Catholics in Moscow requires the admission of Archbishop Boris into the United States for an indefinite period to head an American church organization. Inasmuch as the Soviet Government indicated in its note of November 10 that Archbishop Boris would fulfill this broad and unacceptable function, the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs was requested by the American Embassy at Moscow on November 12, 1955, to return the passports of the Archbishop and his secretary so that their U.S. visas could be canceled. At the same time, the willingness of the U. S. Government to admit a Soviet clergyman to fulfill functions comparable to those permitted the American priest in Moscow was reaffirmed.

² *Ibid.*, Nov. 14, 1955, p. 784.

³ Not printed.

¹ BULLETIN of July 18, 1955, p. 102.

The Principle of Self-Determination in International Relations

by Deputy Under Secretary Murphy¹

I welcome this opportunity to bring before you the problem which is presented in applying the principle of self-determination in international relations. It is, as you know, a question which has been occupying the attention of the United Nations for some years. Of course, the problem has a long historical background and was particularly prominent in the deliberations of the Paris Peace Conference after the First World War. It will doubtless continue to demand the attention of statesmen far into the future. It is well, therefore, that this conference should review the problem with all the detachment and objectivity which it deserves. It is indeed a perplexing problem, full of paradoxes, and any light which can be thrown upon it would greatly assist us in the present stage of discussions with other nations.

Self-determination is a concept which in essence is lofty and unchallengeable. The exercise of self-determination in the form of national liberty has been a great historic factor in the modern world. Our Declaration of Independence and the American Revolution which sealed that independence stand high among the monuments to human freedom. But the meaning of self-determination, and especially its applications, frequently lead to sharp differences and even to heated controversy.

We can observe both the scope and the limitations of self-determination when we consider our own experience as a Nation. There are two great and decisive facts in the history of the American people. We struggled to free ourselves from alien rule, and we struggled to remain a united people by rejecting the principle of secession carried to

the point where we as a nation would have ceased to exist.

It will be recalled that President Wilson stated in 1916 that "the small States of the world have a right to enjoy the same respect for their sovereignty and their territorial integrity that great and powerful States expect and insist upon." The States he had in mind were primarily those territories in Central and Eastern Europe which had long been under the domination of the Austro-Hungarian and Russian empires. At a somewhat later period, in testifying before a Senate committee, President Wilson stated that he did not believe this principle could be successfully applied to all territories throughout the world which were seeking full self-government and independence.

Nevertheless, in spite of the difficulties in defining and applying self-determination, the basic concept or principle commands our strongest support, and few responsible statesmen can be found anywhere to challenge the principle. Moreover, that the principle has gained wider emphasis and acceptance in the last half century may be seen from the fact that, while the word was not mentioned in the covenant of the League of Nations, it is inscribed twice in the charter of the United Nations. Perhaps we as Americans should take some pride in recalling that, while President Wilson tried but failed to get a mention of self-determination into the covenant, the United States delegation at San Francisco took a prominent part in getting it into the charter. Its inscription in the charter is, as you know, stated as a principle. It is stated in both articles 1 and 55 in terms of "respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples." These words, I may say, were most carefully formulated.

More recently, the Pacific Charter was signed at Manila on September 8, 1954, by representatives

¹Address made before a conference on "Africa and Asia in the World Community," sponsored by the Catholic Association for International Peace, at Washington, D. C., on Nov. 12 (press release 644 dated Nov. 11).

of Australia, France, New Zealand, Pakistan, Republic of the Philippines, Thailand, the United Kingdom, and the United States of America. In this charter the signatory parties proclaimed that "in accordance with the provisions of the United Nations Charter, they uphold the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples and they will earnestly strive by every peaceful means to promote self-government and to secure the independence of all countries whose peoples desire it and are able to undertake its responsibilities."

Freedom of Choice

What then is the essence of this concept of self-determination to which we all agree? The central idea, I think, may be simply stated as follows: Peoples and nations should have an opportunity freely to choose their own national destiny without restraints, coercion, or intimidation. Perhaps the essence of the concept lies in "freedom of choice," and it should be noted that in the charter it is stated as a principle and not as an unqualified right. As we all know, the idea of freedom, whether in personal, social, or national life, cannot be wholly unqualified since the limits of one man's freedom must necessarily be conditioned by the limits of another; and here perhaps is where our difficulties begin. It is for this reason the United States delegation at the United Nations is urging that a much more profound study of the whole problem be made before adopting proposals and resolutions which have been brought before the Assembly.

Let us consider some of the difficulties. We start by agreeing that a people or nation should be able freely to determine its own destiny. But what is a "people"? What is a "nation"? What constitutes "freedom of choice"? How is it to be determined? When is it feasible to apply? These and similar questions have never been clearly defined or agreed upon. Until there is a wider measure of agreement on these elements of the problem we feel that we must proceed with caution lest we create more problems than we might be solving in approving various proposals which have been presented to the Assembly.

Some Pertinent Questions

I should like to return again for a moment to the perplexing elements of the problem. First, what is a "people"? How large a group is it and

how tied together? Is it a minority group and is a minority defined by racial, ethnic, or religious factors or by some combination of all of these? This line of thinking leads us to recognize that in many States today, be it Switzerland, Belgium, or the United States, there are many different elements comprising differences in racial origin, language, religion, and culture that make up its population. Such differences may lead to federal rather than unitary arrangements without breaking up the State. In the emergent State of Nigeria today we may observe before our eyes the process of using the federal concept to accommodate sharply different elements between the Islamic north and the Bantu to the south.

Secondly, how are we to define the related concept of "nation"? We are aware that a nation is not always coterminous with a State. In our time Hitler attempted to exercise influence and even authority over populations which he held to be a part of the German nation although citizens of other States. We are probably all aware of having a certain national consciousness which identifies us with people of our kind living in other countries. But we would not for that reason consider it practical to carry this to the point where under the principle of self-determination nations should interfere with or ultimately replace States. The problem which arises under the concept of a "nation" obviously requires very much more thought than has yet been given to it in current international discussions.

A third element of difficulty, as I have mentioned, involves the concept of "freedom of choice." I have already indicated that freedom of choice almost immediately encounters practical limitations. When the German section of the Sudetenland was accorded by the Nazi regime the freedom to choose association with the Reich, it immediately resulted in a limitation on the freedom of the majority of the population of Czechoslovakia. Not only was their freedom limited, but their security was menaced. The example which I have already used from our own history—the War between the States—shows that the exercise of such freedom by one element of the population was bound to have far-reaching effects upon the freedom of the rest of the population. I will not belabor this point further since it is obvious that the exercise of such freedom must be qualified if injustice is not to result.

Freedom of choice, however, should mean that

a people or a nation should not have its destiny determined by force or coercion from the outside. We can recall with sadness in our own time formerly independent States, especially in Eastern Europe, which have been deprived of their freedom and have had a status forced upon them by an alien people. Perhaps we may say that the colonial problem only becomes a problem when alien rule is badly exercised or exercised beyond the time when it is either wanted or necessary. It is for this reason that Secretary Dulles, in referring to the problem of colonialism, indicated that the question of timing is of the utmost importance and delicacy.

South West Africa as an Example

Another element of difficulty involves the question of when it is feasible to apply the principle of self-determination. There are areas in the world today, particularly in certain dependent areas, as for example in the Mandated Territory of South West Africa—to choose only one example—where advancement toward civilization has not yet proceeded far enough to enable those peoples to determine their own destiny. The question of South West Africa has been before the United Nations since 1946. In that year the late Field Marshal Smuts presented a proposal to the effect that South West Africa should be incorporated within the Union of South Africa and that such incorporation was favored by the inhabitants of that territory, who, he said, had been consulted and had freely chosen incorporation in the Union. The small European minority of the population had expressed its view through its Legislative Assembly, while the native population had been consulted through the Chiefs. The majority of the members of the General Assembly, however, led by the delegations of Cuba, China, Egypt, Haiti, and others, held that "In view of the state of development of the native population, it was impossible to believe that the latter had fully understood the nature and extent of the consultation." In the same discussion the Chinese delegate questioned whether the people of South West Africa had sufficient political advancement to permit a full understanding of the purpose and consequence of their decision, and he questioned their ability to express their choice freely.

The result of the discussion led to the approval by the General Assembly of a resolution, proposed

by the United States, India, and Denmark, which constituted a rejection of the South African proposal for incorporation and a recommendation that the territory be placed under the International Trusteeship System. The resolution stated that this action was taken "considering that the African inhabitants of South West Africa have not yet secured political autonomy or reached a stage of political development enabling them to express a considered opinion which the Assembly could recognize on such an important question as incorporation of their territory."

These, then, are some of the questions which arise when we attempt to apply the principle of self-determination.

Let me repeat again that the United States is entirely sympathetic with this principle. We have not only taken the initiative in getting it inscribed in the charter, but we want to see it applied wherever feasible to well-defined groups of people just as soon as they are capable of determining their own destiny and can do so without bringing undue injury to others. When we see national entities like the Gold Coast and Nigeria moving into statehood, we heartily rejoice. One of the most significant developments of the decade has been the emergence of no less than twelve States, including the Philippines, India, Pakistan, Burma, Indonesia, Syria, Lebanon, etc., comprising over 600 million people, who have emerged as fully independent States; and we look forward to the day when the remaining non-self-governing territories, large and small, shall have attained the goal of self-government and, where suitable, the status of independence. And, of course, it is always our fervent hope that this status may be obtained by free choice and without bloodshed. At the same time, the charter articles on self-determination should not be given the far-reaching interpretation of a general right for any people or country to break all ties with the mother country.

From what I have said, I believe it is clear that there are not only widely varying interpretations of the meaning of self-determination but also many different views as to the way in which the principle can be applied in widely differing situations. For these reasons, among others, the United States delegation at the General Assembly will propose that the whole question of self-determination should be made the subject of a much more profound study to see if a substantial measure of agreement on the meaning and essential

elements of the problem can be reached before adopting various other concrete proposals which have been presented to the Assembly.

Let me say at once that this proposal of the United States is not in any sense intended to result in any delay, particularly in any delay in making desirable advances in the colonial field. Our attitude toward the colonial question continues to be as stated by Secretary Dulles that "There is no slightest wavering in our conviction that the orderly transition from colonial to self-governing status should be carried resolutely to a completion." The key words in this statement are "orderly" and "resolutely." The word "orderly" implies that a well-defined people or nation should have the opportunity to emerge into a status of self-government or, where suitable, independence, but that this status should not be undertaken prematurely, but at the same time be early enough so that violence is avoided. By the word "resolutely," on the other hand, we mean that the status should not be made subject to any undue delay.

Views of President and Congress

President Eisenhower in his recent speech at the meeting commemorating the tenth anniversary of the founding of the United Nations at San Francisco expressed our policy in similar terms.² He said that "on every nation in possession of foreign territories, there rests the responsibility to assist the peoples of those areas in the progressive development of free political institutions so that ultimately they can validly choose for themselves their permanent political status." Moreover, if I should refer to another expression of American sentiment, it would be in a recent concurrent resolution unanimously adopted by the Congress [H. Con. Res. 149, 84th Cong., 1st sess.]. That resolution held that the United States should administer its foreign policies and programs and exercise its influence so as to support other peoples in their efforts to achieve self-determination or independence under circumstances which will enable them to assume and maintain an equal station among the free nations of the world. What these circumstances are is perhaps the main question which should concern us in our study of the right way and the right time to apply the principle of self-determination.

² BULLETIN of July 4, 1955, p. 3.

In considering the more abstract difficulties in applying the principle of self-determination, it must not be forgotten that the U.S. position must also be based on practical considerations. In many instances self-determination is not the only issue involved. Frequently there are security and constitutional considerations, domestic jurisdiction, and other matters which must be taken into account.

In the discussions in the various bodies of the United Nations we have tried to follow with sympathy and understanding the views of other nations. We fully realize that the respective views on self-determination largely depend upon a nation's experiences and the steps by which it has attained, or is about to attain, statehood. One group of countries has been much concerned with the way in which their natural resources have been developed by outside capital and experience. Nevertheless, it must be pointed out that no country has actually lost its sovereignty over its natural wealth and resources. In fact, the major U.S. companies established abroad have made an excellent record in establishing relations with foreign governments on a contractual basis and thus safeguarding the interests of the countries concerned. Some of these nations have pressed for a United Nations resolution which would stress "the right of peoples and nations to permanent sovereignty over their natural wealth and resources." These delegations have expressed a fear that they would lose control over their natural resources and wished to assert or reassert their "sovereignty" over them. To this end they would propose that a commission be established to conduct a full survey of the right of peoples and nations to permanent sovereignty over these resources.

Now in our view, without questioning the right of a nation over its natural wealth and resources, such a survey would raise serious questions in the minds of private investors and tend to neutralize and perhaps discourage the international flow of private capital and thus retard that economic development of underdeveloped countries so much needed and desired by many nations.³ It is obvious that the concept of self-determination held by these powers was undeniably political in origin, and we feel, therefore, that the premises on which

³ For U.S. statements at the General Assembly on this subject, see *ibid.*, Nov. 14, 1955, p. 808, and Nov. 21, 1955, p. 858.

it is based would be not only inconsistent with our own view that the whole concept requires first a comprehensive and analytical study but its acceptance would prejudice our whole idea of such a study.

Another group of nations has been especially concerned with what they call the denial or inadequate realization of political self-determination. This group tends to emphasize the inherent right of peoples to the exercise of political self-determination and is inclined to argue that the time has come to implement as fully and rapidly as possible definite proposals for self-determination in order to avoid disorder and bloodshed.

The United States on the other hand remains fully convinced that to proceed at too rapid or too slow a pace is to risk the extension of areas of disorder. It is our feeling that to adopt a resolution on political self-determination which would leave the identification of so-called inadequate realization of self-determination to any ten members of the United Nations would be both unwise and indefensible, especially in view of the wide divergencies which exist regarding the concept of self-determination. Furthermore, we believe that the appointment of such a commission would unnecessarily duplicate functions already being carried out by such existing United Nations bodies.

Opposition of Colonial Powers

A third group of powers consisting mainly of the principal colonial powers is convinced that the proposals so far advanced in the United Nations on self-determination are contrary to article 2 (7) of the charter which states that "Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter. . . ." It should be pointed out furthermore that such proposals are based on the concept of the *right* of self-determination, which is not mentioned in the United Nations Charter. But in a wider sense the opposition of the so-called colonial powers is not merely a legalistic one. They are no doubt imbued with the feeling that they are doing a good job in raising the political, social, economic, and educational level of the non-self-governing territories under their control. They believe that to apply prematurely the principle of self-determination to some would only re-

sult in a dislocation of the economy of these territories and disturb the political stability that now exists and their steady march to full self-government or independence.

Because of these widely varying interpretations and sometimes diametrically opposing views as to the meaning of the concept of self-determination, we have come to the conclusion that the whole subject should be analyzed and studied to see if a substantial measure of agreement on the meaning of the essential elements of self-determination could be reached.

The parliamentary position, therefore, as far as the United Nations is concerned, is that three resolutions are being transmitted by the Economic and Social Council [Ecosoc] to the General Assembly for consideration. One is concerned with permanent sovereignty over natural wealth and resources. The second proposes the setting up of a commission to receive appeals in the field of political self-determination from any ten members. And the third, which the United States sponsored at the recent meeting of the Economic and Social Council in the summer of 1955, proposes the establishment of an *ad hoc* commission on self-determination consisting of five persons to be appointed by the Secretary-General to conduct a thorough study of the concept of self-determination.⁴ It further proposes that the terms of reference of this commission should include an examination of the concept of "peoples" and "nations"; the essential attributes and applicability of the principle of self-determination, including the rights and duties of States under international law; the relationship between the principle of self-determination and other charter principles; and the economic, social, and political conditions under which the application of the principle would be facilitated.

U.S. Position at General Assembly

The United States proposal, which was approved by the Ecosoc for transmission with the other two draft resolutions to the General Assembly, was based on our belief in the necessity of a thorough and objective study of the principle of self-determination. It is in accord with the traditional policy of the United States which supports the principle of equal rights and self-determina-

⁴Ecosoc/Res. 586 D (XX).

tion for peoples. At the current General Assembly meeting in New York, the U.S. delegation is making every effort not only to secure the adoption of a forward-looking resolution based on the United States proposal adopted by the Ecosoc but also to enable the application of the principle of self-determination to be carried out resolutely in an orderly fashion and under circumstances which will enable peoples to assume and maintain an equal station among the free peoples of the world.

I have tried to consider with perfect frankness the objectives and aims of the United States on the question of self-determination. Before closing I should like to make it clear that we believe it to be our duty to approach colonial questions in terms of the enlightened self-interest of the United States. I should like to stress that the problem of self-determination is not exclusively a colonial problem, for we believe that the application of the principle should not be limited to colonial territories but should be universal in scope and should apply just as much to territories within the Soviet orbit in Europe and Asia which have been denied the full exercise of self-determination as to any non-self-governing territory.

At Geneva President Eisenhower stated that "the problem of respecting the right of peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live" was an important cause of international tension and added that "the American people feel strongly that certain peoples of Eastern Europe, many with a long and proud record of national existence, have not yet been given the benefit of this pledge of our United Nations wartime declaration, reinforced by other wartime agreements."⁵ We also firmly believe, as Secretary Dulles has stated, in the necessity for the orderly and resolute evolution toward self-determination. Only in this way can we adhere fully and without wavering to our conviction that the orderly transition from colonial to self-governing status should be carried resolutely to a completion.

In conclusion, I should like to leave with you the thought that self-determination is not a problem capable of quick and easy solution. We Americans are by tradition and fundamental political faith inspired by the feeling that the domination of one people over another is repugnant to our idea of freedom. American public opinion as reflected in editorials and congressional comments believes

⁵ BULLETIN of Aug. 1, 1955, p. 172.

that the colonial relationship is essentially unsatisfactory and that it should give way to self-government as rapidly as feasible. Even though we are responsible for the administration of some dependent areas of our own, there is a very generally held feeling in this country that this relationship should be regarded as temporary or transitional in character.

But in the interest of world peace and stability, we recognize the necessity of proceeding in an orderly and resolute fashion in applying the principle of self-determination throughout the world. We should proceed with good judgment, sympathy, and understanding in order that self-determination may be a blessing both to those peoples who exercise it and to those who are affected by it.

Return of Mohammed V to Morocco

Press release 657 dated November 18

The U.S. Government welcomes the return of Mohammed V to Morocco and on this anniversary of his accession to the throne wishes to extend warm and friendly greetings to him and the people of Morocco.

His Majesty's return marks a significant step in the development of cooperation between Morocco and France. While there are many problems yet to be worked out, the degree of concession and the friendly spirit which are demonstrated by both French and Moroccans augur well for success in working out mutually satisfactory arrangements. It is earnestly hoped that such arrangements will lead to the peace and prosperity of the Moroccan community.

Need for Peaceful Settlement of Near East Problems

The White House Office at Gettysburg on November 15 made public the following exchange of correspondence between President Eisenhower and Rabbi Abba Hillel Silver.

The President to Rabbi Silver

Rabbi ABBA HILLEL SILVER
Commodore Hotel
New York, N. Y.

I am glad to comply with your request to send a message to the meeting which you are addressing

this evening, as I know of your great concern about the recent developments in the Near East which disturb all of us.

A threat to peace in the Near East is a threat to world peace. As I said the other day,¹ while we continue willing to consider requests for arms needed for legitimate self-defense, we do not intend to contribute to an arms competition in the Near East. We will continue to be guided by the policies of the Tripartite Declaration of May 25, 1950. We believe this policy best promotes the interest and security of the peoples of the area.

We believe the true and lasting security in the area must be based upon a just and reasonable settlement. It seems to me that current problems are capable of resolution by peaceful means. There is no reason why a settlement of these problems cannot be found, and when realized I would be prepared to recommend that the United States join in formal treaty engagements to prevent or thwart any effort by either side to alter by force the boundaries upon which Israel and its immediate neighbors agree.

The need for a peaceful settlement becomes daily more imperative. The United States will play its full part in working toward such a settlement and will support firmly the United Nations in its efforts to prevent violence in the area. By firm friendship towards Israel and all other Nations in the Near East, we shall continue to contribute to the peace of the world.

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER

Rabbi Silver to the President

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I have been profoundly disturbed by the recent events in the Near East which have aroused deep apprehension in Israel and among peace-loving people everywhere. I am to address on November 15th a mass rally at Madison Square Garden in the City of New York in which many civic, religious and labor organizations will participate to express the vital concern over the situation. I know that they would welcome a word from you as coming not only from the Chief Executive of our beloved country but as the foremost spokesman of international justice, freedom and peace in the world today. Personally I would greatly appreciate such a message.

¹ BULLETIN of Nov. 21, 1955, p. 845.

With warmest regards and with all good wishes for your complete recovery and well being.

ABBA HILLEL SILVER

United States Liaison With Baghdad Pact Organization

Press release 660 dated November 19

The initial meeting of the Baghdad Pact organization is scheduled to take place in Baghdad on November 21.¹ The members of the pact have invited the United States to establish military and political liaison with the organization, and the United States has informed the pact members of its willingness to do so. The United States has designated the American Ambassador to Iraq, Waldemar Gallman, as its special political observer and Adm. John H. Cassady, Commander in Chief, U. S. Naval Forces Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean, and Brig. Gen. Forrest Caraway as its special military observers at the first meeting of the Council. Ambassador Gallman has also been designated to maintain continuing political liaison with the organization, and the U. S. Army Attaché in Baghdad, Col. Henry P. Tucker, to maintain continuing military liaison.

The United States hopes that this new organization will develop increasing strength enabling it to fulfill its defensive purpose.

Conclusion of SEATO Military Planners Meeting at Honolulu

Following is the text of a message sent from Washington by Adm. Arthur Radford, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, at the conclusion of a meeting of staff planners for the military advisers to the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty Council, held at Honolulu November 1-15.²

Please extend my greetings and congratulations to the SEATO Staff Planners upon completion of

¹ A Pact of Mutual Cooperation was signed at Baghdad on Feb. 24, 1955, by Iraq and Turkey and has been adhered to subsequently by the United Kingdom, Pakistan, and Iran.

² The first meeting of the military advisers was held at the time of the SEATO Council meeting at Bangkok in February 1955; see BULLETIN of Mar. 7, 1955, p. 371.

their first meeting on U.S. soil, which is the second in a series toward the goal of an effective defense arrangement for Southeast Asia.

The report of progress in these conferences is most encouraging to the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff and to me personally, particularly in view of my deep interest in this area and my previous assignment as Commander in Chief, Pacific. Reports show complete solidarity among the delegates, which indicates a spirit of teamwork and a subordination of personal and national interest, which demonstrates a unity of effort and an indication of the free-world spirit in this important area.

The staff planners are providing a sound foundation for subsequent discussion by the military advisers and the Council of Ministers, and they should return to their respective countries with a feeling of impressive accomplishment for which the free world is indebted.

Cambodian Religious Leader Visits United States

Press release 653 dated November 17

Recently arrived in the United States as a participant in the International Educational Exchange Program of the Department of State is Chief Venerable Vira Dharmawara of Phnom Penh, Cambodia. The Venerable, an elder in the Mohanikay Order of Buddhist Monks and an eminent teacher as well as spiritual leader, has been invited to visit the United States to observe the American way of life, particularly in relation to its educational and religious aspects. He expects to be in this country about 3 months.

Venerable Dharmawara is a Fellow of the Buddhist World Mission and Tract Society and the founder of the Asoka Mission as well as founder-in-charge of the Asoka Vihara (shrine). He is also director of the Asoka Health Center, a member of the Executive Committee of the International Youth Hostel in New Delhi, and Permanent Representative of the Royal Government of Cambodia on the committee for the maintenance of Buddha Gaya Temple sponsored by the Government of Bihar (India). He attended the Asian-African Conference at Bandung, Indonesia, as an adviser to the Royal Cambodian Delegation on religious and cultural matters.

The Asia Foundation cooperated with the Department in arranging for some of the Venerable's appointments in the San Francisco area on his arrival in the United States.

Mexico Makes Final Payment Under 1941 Claims Convention

Press release 655 dated November 18

The Mexican Ambassador to the United States, Manuel Tello, on November 18 presented to Deputy Under Secretary Robert Murphy the Mexican Government's check for \$1,500,000 U.S. currency, representing the final payment due the United States under the Claims Convention concluded November 19, 1941. Mr. Murphy requested the Ambassador to convey to his Government this Government's appreciation.

Under the terms of the convention, Mexico agreed to pay the United States \$40,000,000 U.S. currency, as the balance due from the Government of Mexico in full settlement of the following claims:

(a) All claims filed by the Governments of the United States of America and of the United Mexican States with the General Claims Commission, established by the two countries pursuant to the convention signed September 8, 1923;

(b) All agrarian claims of nationals of the United States of America against the Government of the United Mexican States, which arose subsequent to August 30, 1927, and prior to October 7, 1940, including those referred to in the agreement effected by exchange of notes signed by the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the United Mexican States on November 9 and 12, 1938, respectively; and

(c) All other claims of nationals of either country, which arose subsequent to January 1, 1927, and prior to October 7, 1940, and involving international responsibility of either Government toward the other Government as a consequence of damage to, or loss or destruction of, or wrongful interference with the property of the nationals of either country.

Not included in the convention were claims based upon expropriation of petroleum properties. Payment on those claims was completed in 1947.

U.S. Officials Leave for Visit to South America

DEPARTMENT ANNOUNCEMENT

The Department of State announced on November 16 (press release 648) the itinerary for the group of U.S. Government officials leaving Washington on November 17 for a 16-day visit to South America. The party will arrive at Bogotá, Colombia, on November 18; at Quito, Ecuador, on November 20; at Lima, Peru, on November 22; at La Paz, Bolivia, on November 25; at Santiago, Chile, on November 27; and at Buenos Aires, Argentina, on November 30.

A primary object of the trip is to enable officials of the U.S. Government agencies represented to discuss with our Embassies, and with government officials and others in the countries visited, various aspects of inter-American problems. The delegation will include:

Henry F. Holland, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs

Samuel C. Waugh, President, Export-Import Bank

Maj. Gen. Robert W. Douglass, USAF, Chairman of the U.S. Delegation to the Inter-American Defense Board

Rollin S. Atwood, Director, Latin American Operations, International Cooperation Administration

Jack C. Corbett, Director, Office of International Financial and Development Affairs, Department of State

Maurice M. Bernbaum, Director, Office of South American Affairs, Department of State

Walter Sauer, Vice President, Export-Import Bank

Charles R. Harley, Chief, Latin American Division, Office of International Finance, Department of the Treasury

Col. Thomas B. Hanford, USA, Chief, Western Hemisphere Branch, Office of International Security Affairs, Department of Defense

Maj. George Williamson, USAF, Secretary of the U.S. Delegation to the Inter-American Defense Board

DEPARTURE STATEMENT BY ASSISTANT SECRETARY HOLLAND

Press release 654 dated November 17

I feel very fortunate to have this opportunity to make a trip to some of our South American neighbors accompanied by Mr. Samuel Waugh, President of the Export-Import Bank, Mr. Rollin S. Atwood, Acting President of the Institute of

Inter-American Affairs, and Maj. Gen. Robert Douglass, a representative of the Department of Defense, and the other members of our party. This trip will enable us to make an on-the-ground survey of situations affecting our relations with the countries which we are to visit. It is also a good idea for representatives of our Government to have the opportunity to discuss matters of mutual interest at first hand with representatives of other governments.

I shall be interested in seeing, myself, how the economic policies enunciated at the Meeting of Ministers of Finance and Economy at Rio de Janeiro a year ago¹ are going forward. This visit is especially timely in that regard because there will be another meeting of the ministers at Buenos Aires next year. At the meeting last year we stated our intention to help maintain a stable and expanding market for their export products. This has resulted, in part, from the fact that we had been able to maintain a high rate of economic activity within the United States. This, in turn, has meant the maintenance of a good market for Latin American export products, approximately one-half of which are sold in this country. The executive branch and the Congress have been successful in resisting efforts that have been made to increase tariffs and other barriers to the importation of Latin American export commodities. We have thus been able to continue to accord favorable customs treatment to Latin American export products.

At the Rio meeting also we expressed the intention of the United States to dispose of its agricultural surpluses in an orderly manner and in such a way that a large part of the sales might be used to finance economic development projects and expand consumption in the Latin American countries purchasing the surpluses. Since then we have negotiated such agreements with six of the governments of Latin American countries,² and discussions are at present going forward with other Latin American countries with a view to concluding similar agreements.

At the same time and place we promised increased government assistance to supplement the

¹ For a statement made by Secretary of the Treasury George M. Humphrey at the Rio meeting on Nov. 23, 1954, see BULLETIN of Dec. 6, 1954, p. 863.

² Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru. For an announcement of the agreement with Brazil, see p. 898.

efforts of private investment capital to further the economic development of Latin America. We have done many things to fulfill this promise. For instance, in the last fiscal year the Export-Import Bank authorized new credits to Latin America of \$284,000,000 as compared to the \$52,200,000 for the preceding fiscal year.

At the Rio meeting we expressed our willingness to strengthen technical assistance to our Latin American neighbors. Our programs in this field have been substantially strengthened.

The trip will be of particular interest and help to Messrs. Waugh and Atwood, who have just entered on their new duties with the Export-Import Bank and the International Cooperation Administration respectively.

We are also fortunate in having with us representatives of the Department of Defense, which has contributed in a major degree to our relations with the countries which we are to visit.

My only regret is that this trip could not last longer or go farther, but I hope and expect to be able to visit the four other South American countries during the early part of next year.

Inter-American Highway in Costa Rica

The Export-Import Bank on November 7 announced that it has authorized the establishment of a credit line of \$9,540,000 in favor of the Government of Costa Rica. This credit will be used by Costa Rica to finance its share of the cost of completing that portion of the Inter-American Highway which passes through its territory.

Work on the Inter-American Highway has been proceeding for a number of years under a financing arrangement whereby the United States has traditionally provided two-thirds of the funds, with the participating Central American countries adding the other third as well as providing the required right-of-way. The U.S. Congress has recently appropriated a total of almost \$63 million in accordance with a program to accelerate completion within a 3-year period of the 1,590-mile stretch of the highway between the Mexican-Guatemalan border and the Panama Canal.

About \$16 million of this amount will represent the two-thirds contribution of the United States to the estimated cost of completing the Costa Rican

portion of this highway. The work to be done in Costa Rica involves the completion of 353 miles of highway and the erection of a number of bridges. The money to be made available under the Export-Import Bank credit will be used to pay for the necessary road machinery, construction equipment, and materials which will be purchased in the United States.

In announcing the credit, Samuel C. Waugh, President of the Export-Import Bank said: "We believe that the improved transportation facilities resulting from the completion of the highway will contribute to the economic development of Costa Rica and the other Central American countries, and through the stimulation of tourist traffic will provide for a better understanding between the American Republics."

Surplus Commodity Agreement Signed With Brazil

Press release 650 dated November 16

The Minister of Foreign Affairs of Brazil, José Carlos de Macedo Soares, and the United States Ambassador to Brazil, James Clement Dunn, signed an agreement on November 16 for the sale of surplus agricultural commodities valued at approximately \$41,000,000. The program for the sale of these commodities was developed pursuant to title I of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954 (Public Law 480, 83d Congress, as amended).

Payment for the agricultural commodities will be made in Brazilian currency. A portion of the currency accruing under this program will be used to meet U. S. Government expenses in Brazil. An additional part of the funds will be loaned to the Brazilian Government for development purposes, with eventual repayment to the United States. The remainder will be used for agricultural marketing development in Brazil and the carrying out of an educational exchange program between Brazil and the United States.

Four members of the House Agricultural Committee who are touring South America were in Rio de Janeiro and were invited to attend the signing ceremonies. They are: Charles B. Hoeven, Harold O. Lovre, Ray J. Madden, and William R. Poage.

What We Get From the United Nations

by Francis O. Wilcox

Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs¹

There is nothing unseemly or unduly materialistic in asking ourselves what we get—we as a people and as a Government—from the United Nations. After all, the 60 nations that *are* the United Nations became members and remain so because it is in their national self-interest. In its first 10 years no nation has left the organization, while a score of states are impatiently awaiting admission. There must be real advantages and opportunities that go with membership.

The American public has always strongly supported our participation, but this support has fluctuated somewhat. In the early days after its founding there was, perhaps, considerable overoptimism based largely on a misunderstanding of the United Nations' role. Many thought that it would provide a painless cure-all or panacea for the world's ills. They were disappointed when this did not prove to be the case; apparently they did not realize its limitations. Since then, in the light of experience, we have learned what the United Nations can and cannot do and how to use it better to advance our national interests and the cause of world peace.

What the United Nations Is

In this perspective, it might be useful to define just what the United Nations is.

At the outset, however, it is important to keep in mind what the United Nations is *not*, because some people make the mistake of condemning the organization for the weaknesses of its members. We would do well to remember the limitations of

the United Nations. It is *not* a superstate. It is *not* a world government by any stretch of the imagination. It has no power to legislate, to tax, or to compel us to take action against our will. It is made up of 60 sovereign, independent nations, and it cannot rise above its source. In the final analysis, it can only do what its members want it to do.

The United Nations is two things: It is both a statement of principles to guide the conduct of nations in their relations with one another, and it is a working organization to help put these principles into practice.

The preamble and chapter I of the charter set forth the principles and purposes of the organization. It is the consensus of the 52 founding nations as to the moral standards and ethics in international relations which should be followed for the welfare of mankind. In general, the purposes and principles set forth in the charter correspond exactly with the broad foreign policy objectives of the United States. Considering the wide differences in racial, cultural, and political backgrounds of the founders, it is a very remarkable document indeed.

The Moral Force of the United Nations

For 10 years the United Nations has served as a forum in which nations have been tested against this code of conduct. This has been of tremendous value to the free world. For the first time, international communism has been obliged to step out in the open and expose itself to the floodlight of public opinion. Here Communist statements of their devotion to world peace and respect for human rights have been weighed against the record of their conduct. In the process the true nature and

¹ Address made before the Community Workshop Division of the Oklahoma City Libraries and the Oklahoma Committee of the U.S. Committee for the United Nations at Oklahoma City, Okla., on Nov. 8.

danger of Communist imperialism has been clearly revealed.

It is said that "Ye shall know the truth, and the truth shall make you free." The United Nations has done much to set the world free from the confusion and subterfuge which has cloaked the Communist movement. Now that it is out in the open we can devise ways to cope with it and to check its expansion. Moreover, the United Nations is, I believe, forcing international communism to modify its methods and perhaps even to alter its goals out of "a decent respect to the opinions of mankind." A state cannot remain in the U.N. and continually ignore the pressure of world opinion. Sooner or later it must accommodate its actions to the moral judgments of its fellow members. There have been examples of such accommodation on the part of the Soviet Union in the United Nations. They illustrate the manner in which the United Nations Organization can put its principles into action.

Influence of the United Nations on Soviet Policies

There was the case of Iran. After the war the Soviet Union kept military forces in Iran threatening the security and sovereignty of that country. The matter was placed before the United Nations and reluctantly, unable to justify its actions before world opinion, the U.S.S.R. withdrew its troops.

There was the case of Greece. This country, too, was the object of Communist imperialist designs. By subversion, border incidents, and threat of aggression the Communists tried to take over the Government of Greece, which was weakened and disunited at the end of the Second World War. The plight of Greece was a threat to international peace. The U.N., over the protests of the Soviet Union, placed observer teams in the border areas to determine the situation and report back. The Communists were caught "redhanded" and gradually ceased their threats and provocations. With this danger removed, Greece, with help from the free world, was able to set her house in order and restore economic and political stability.

More recently there is the example of the peaceful uses of atomic energy. You will recall that in December 1953 President Eisenhower addressed the General Assembly and proposed that the world's atomic powers unite to bring the blessings of this new-found force to the service of mankind. The cooperation of the Soviet Union was highly

desirable but not essential. For a whole year, in public and private negotiations, we tried to enlist the support of the U.S.S.R. without success. Finally, we again placed the matter before the United Nations. We proposed the holding of an international peaceful-uses conference and the establishment of an International Atomic Energy Agency. We urged the General Assembly to move ahead with or without the Soviet Union.

It was immediately apparent that there was overwhelming approval among the free nations for the United States proposal. This was apparent to the Communist bloc. They had three choices. When the matter came to a vote, they could abstain, they could vote against, or they could vote for the proposal. They had to stand up and be counted on an issue which would put their peaceful protestations to the acid test. Thanks to the moral force of public opinion, they voted solidly in favor of the new agency. It was one of those relatively rare occasions when a unanimous vote has been forthcoming from the General Assembly.²

There have been times when the Soviet Union has tried to marshal the moral censure of the United Nations against the United States. They have not been successful. Take the spurious charges of germ warfare which the U.S.S.R. leveled against us in the General Assembly in 1952. They attempted to prove, on completely fabricated evidence, that our Air Force had dropped germs of various kinds on civilian populations in the Korean war. Their evidence did not stand up under objective examination. Their case fell apart at the seams, and in the process the free world learned an important lesson about the nature and tactics of communism.

United Nations Supports U.S. Foreign Policy Objectives

I think you will agree with me that these illustrations bear out my contention that the United Nations has given powerful support to free-world and United States foreign policy interests.

I do not mean to imply that the United Nations is a rubber stamp for our policies or that we always have our own way. Far from it. We continually have to adjust our positions and policies

² BULLETIN of Dec. 13, 1954, p. 918. For developments on the International Atomic Energy Agency in the Tenth Session of the General Assembly, see *ibid.*, Sept. 5, 1955, p. 384, and Oct. 24, 1955, p. 660.

in the light of the opinions and interests of 59 other states. This is as it should be. American foreign policy must be founded on a knowledge of the attitudes of the governments and peoples of other countries if it is to be realistic and effective. There is no better place to "feel the pulse," so to speak, of world opinion than the United Nations.

In this connection we all have a real obligation to keep ourselves informed of the facts. I am frequently surprised at the harm that can come to our foreign policy and to the United Nations from a little misinformation.

The United States Can't "Go It Alone"

One of the basic reasons for the establishment of the United Nations was the realization that no nation can "go it alone" in the search for security and peace. The United States in particular, with much of the world's wealth and only 6 percent of the population, cannot have too many partners in the struggle to establish a permanent peace and, if need be, to defend freedom wherever it may be attacked.

The most dramatic example of uniting to resist aggression was the Korean war. Here the great majority of United Nations members condemned the Communist invasion of the Republic of Korea as a violation of the cardinal principles of the charter. Sixteen nations contributed military forces to throw back this aggression, and some 42 in all provided aid to the Republic of Korea in one form or another. When the Communists struck in Korea, these countries knew "for whom the bell tolled."

Sometimes we Americans become impatient with our friends in the United Nations because they do not always behave as we would like to see them behave. Actually there are only about three types of foreign policies from which we can choose. We might choose isolationism, or on the other extreme we might even be foolish enough to try and dominate the world. The only other workable alternative is to build a coalition of equal partners jointly dedicated to the task of keeping the free world free.

That is exactly why our role of leadership in the United Nations is so difficult. We are part of an alliance of free and independent nations. In such an alliance honest differences of opinion are bound to arise and these differences are played up by all the devices known to Communist propaganda.

The right to disagree has always been considered the basic element of strength in a democracy. It is just as basic to the democratic unity that we want to prevail in the free world.

So we should not be too concerned if our Latin American friends disagree with us or if Great Britain votes against us occasionally in the Security Council. The fact that we disagree in some respects is not nearly so important as the fact that we *do* agree on our common goals.

The United Nations does not, of course, take the place of normal diplomatic relations between countries. It does provide a new and wider forum, however, for diplomatic contact which we have learned to use in cases which would be difficult or impossible for us to solve directly and alone. The return of the American fliers held illegally by the Chinese Communists is a case in point.

We have no diplomatic relations with the Chinese Communist regime, and it was therefore not possible for us to use normal diplomatic procedures in seeking the return of the fliers. Certainly we did not want to resort to war with Communist China to settle the issue. In this situation we turned to the United Nations. It was rightly a matter for international concern. The captured fliers had been, at the time of their capture, serving under the United Nations Command. By holding them, the Communists were flouting the terms of the Korean armistice, as well as defying the commonly accepted standards for the treatment of prisoners of war. Furthermore, the United Nations was confronted with the obligation imposed by the language of the charter which provides that "the Organization shall ensure that states which are not Members of the United Nations act in accordance with these Principles."

The United Nations acted promptly. By resolution of the General Assembly, the Secretary-General, Mr. Hammarskjöld, was asked to intercede directly with Chou En-lai, the Chinese Communist Foreign Minister, in the name of the United Nations.³ His skillful and patient and successful negotiations are now a matter of history. The outcome, which brought the fliers safely home to their families, was a victory for the moral force of world public opinion.⁴ Here, again, the United Nations served the interests of the United States exceptionally well.

³ *Ibid.*, Dec. 20, 1954, p. 932.

⁴ *Ibid.*, Aug. 15, 1955, p. 262.

So far in assessing what the United States gets from the United Nations I have confined myself principally to the political field—much of it having to do with the United Nations as a forum for revealing the nature of communism and acting as a guardian of peace. Now I should like to turn to the accomplishments of the United Nations in fulfilling some of the economic and social purposes for which it was established.

Helping Others To Help Themselves

The American people and the American Government have long believed in the principle of helping others to help themselves. Providing relief and assistance to people less fortunate than ourselves has long been a characteristic of American free enterprise and of our Government. We believe it is enlightened self-interest to do so. By helping others to raise their standards of living and stabilize their economies, we help create stable governments, good customers for our products, and reliable allies.

For a good many years now we have engaged in various bilateral technical aid programs to assist underdeveloped countries as an established arm of our foreign policies. We believe in the transferability of knowledge and ideas. We believe that this is one of the best ways to counter the false appeal which communism sometimes has among people with too little food, inadequate medical facilities, and substandard education. We believe that these people have a legitimate right to improve their welfare through access to the great store of technical knowledge and experience possessed by the more developed nations.

The United Nations has provided us with important new ways to supplement our foreign assistance programs based on these long-established principles. I speak particularly of the specialized agencies and the expanded technical aid program which works through them. There is the World Health Organization in the field of health; the FAO in the field of food and agriculture; UNESCO in the fields of science, culture, and education; ILO in the labor field; and a half dozen others.

We supported the establishment of these agencies under the United Nations system, and we have consistently supported and contributed to their programs.

For millions of people throughout the world the United Nations means not the inspiring building

on New York's East River, not the General Assembly, not even the charter with its important statement of principles. It means the United Nations team of experts working in the village or rural community and putting these principles into practice. It means the public-health doctor showing how the dreaded malaria mosquito can be eradicated, the nurse showing how to purify infested water, the agronomist proving the higher yield of hybrid corn.

These are genuinely cooperative programs. They are not "giveaways." The only thing given away is knowledge. Countries contribute proportionately to the annual upkeep or cost of each specialized agency. Then the country receiving assistance contributes again in local currency, manpower, and equipment. Local people are trained on the spot by the United Nations experts so that the work will be carried on after they have left. One heartening result of these programs has been that they have uncovered heretofore untapped talents for leadership in community after community. Relatively primitive peoples use their new-found knowledge to tackle those problems which for centuries have barred the road to higher living standards, more education, wider markets for their products.

We regard our participation in this aspect of the United Nations as a wise investment for the future. Its objective is the same as our bilateral assistance programs, but its cost to us is much less. Also there are some countries which are reluctant or unwilling to receive direct aid from us. They may feel that it is an infringement of their sovereignty or that other countries will think it is. In such cases, in particular, it is to our interest to work through the United Nations. The presence of American experts on United Nations teams is tangible evidence to the local populace of American interest in their welfare. They are ambassadors of good will, demonstrating in their daily work the American way of life.

Communist Attitude Toward the Specialized Agencies

Perhaps one of the most convincing evidences of the effectiveness of United Nations technical aid as an arm of enlightened diplomacy is the Soviet record in the specialized agencies. The U.S.S.R. and the satellite countries have from the beginning given only halfhearted support to this

work. After a time the U.S.S.R withdrew completely from such agencies as the World Health Organization and the International Labor Organization. Apparently they felt that higher standards of living for underdeveloped peoples were not in the interests of communism.

Whatever the reason, they have recently had a significant change of heart. They have rejoined ILO, have announced their intention to resume membership in WHO, and are pledging annually the equivalent of \$1 million to the expanded technical aid program. They may have noted the success of the work of the specialized agencies and the enthusiasm with which it has been received. Everyone likes to be associated with success, and no doubt the Communists feel that they must now show some evidence of their alleged concern for the downtrodden man. Here again is an example of the helpful influence of world opinion as exercised through the United Nations. I do not mean to say that Soviet participation in the specialized agencies is not welcome. It is welcome as long as they abide by the rules of these agencies and do not attempt to exploit them for propaganda or political ends.

Cost of U.S. Participation in the United Nations

One might well assume that the cost of maintaining the United Nations and financing the work of its specialized agencies would come to a huge figure. Such is not the case. Its cost to member nations is surprisingly modest.

The annual budget of the United Nations is apportioned among the 60 member countries on the basis of national population and wealth. On this basis the United States pays approximately 33 percent of the regular U.N. budget. The Soviet Union, the next biggest contributor, pays 17.6 percent. Our share comes to less than 10 cents a year for each person in this country.

If we add to the regular U.N. budget the cost of all the specialized agencies and aid programs, the total for the year 1955 comes to 56 cents for each American. As Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, our representative to the U.N., recently put it, "The amount we spend in a year in all these peaceful endeavors of the United Nations and the various specialized agencies is equal to what 10 hours of World War II cost us."

In quoting these figures I do not imply that we can measure the United Nations worth to us in dollars and cents. Certainly the financial bur-

dens imposed on us by the United Nations are infinitesimal when compared to the terrible costs of fighting an atomic war. And when looked at in terms of our total national budget most Americans would agree that it is a pretty cheap insurance policy.

Some Current Problems Before the U.N.

The sun never sets on the work of the United Nations, for its activities stretch around the world. Its principal bodies, the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council, and the Trusteeship Council, meet frequently at the central headquarters in New York. Meantime, various committees and commissions carry out their special responsibilities.

Once a year, however, the United Nations takes on a unique and intense activity. This is the annual meeting of the General Assembly. During this time the lights literally never go out in the towering headquarters building.

The General Assembly meets in New York in September and continues in session until it has acted on all the items before it. This usually takes about 3 months. Each of the 60 member countries sends a delegation to represent it. The United States delegation always includes prominent leaders drawn from private life and members of the Congress drawn from both sides of the aisle. The Department of State and our permanent mission to the United Nations provide the policy and technical staff and backing.

The Tenth General Assembly is now about half through its session in New York. It has more than 70 items on its agenda. Some of them are of the utmost concern to you and me because they have a bearing on the kind of world we will live in and the future security and well-being of ourselves and our children. I refer to such matters as disarmament, control of nuclear weapons, the peaceful uses of atomic energy, the issue of self-determination (colonialism), et cetera.

These issues, of course, were not created by the United Nations. They reflect the world we live in, its imperfections and its problems. They have come before the U.N. because the U.N. offers the best forum for reaching a solution. It is unlikely that they will be solved quickly or easily. But if the issues are kept out in the open, if they can be debated fully and freely, if the little countries as well as the big ones have an equal chance to

express themselves, then the chances for progress are good. This is one of the important ways in which the General Assembly serves the interests of the free world and of the American people.

Signs of Progress

The General Assembly has been called a "debating society" and, in a healthy sense, it is. Debate is one of the essential and time-honored processes of democracy. It is remarkable that, with 60 countries to be heard from, the General Assembly ever stops talking and takes action. But it does. The rapid progress in the field of peaceful uses of atomic energy, to which I referred earlier, is a case in point. Soon we can expect the international agency itself to be established and in operation. I need only mention the yet undreamed-of possibilities which lie ahead of us in this field to indicate the kind of contribution the United Nations may make in this connection.

Likewise with the proposal for the collection and dissemination of data on the effects of atomic radiation which we introduced in the General Assembly at this session.⁵ This occasioned a great deal of committee debate and behind-the-scenes maneuvering, but the approval of a constructive and workable plan now seems assured.

On the related but much more crucial and difficult issue of disarmament, progress has been slow and painful. To comprehend the difficulties we must discard our preatomic concept of disarmament. This meant, essentially, an agreed-upon reduction among the great powers of the numbers of soldiers, battleships, and combat planes to be maintained by each country.

Today, by disarmament we mean the limitation, regulation, and reduction of armed forces and armaments under an effective international inspection and control system. The great barrier to progress toward this kind of disarmament is the mutual distrust and insecurity existing between the world's two great atomic powers—the United States and the Soviet Union.

To break this deadlock President Eisenhower took a bold initiative at the Geneva "summit" conference last July. He proposed to the Soviet Union that the United States and the U.S.S.R. agree to exchange information and blueprints on military establishments, and to permit unrestricted

aerial overflights and inspection of each other's national territories.⁶

The President's proposal, which was designed to prevent massive surprise attack, was intended as a first step or gateway to disarmament—as a means of reestablishing a basis of mutual security and trust. On such a basis, perhaps, an agreed program for limitation, inspection, and control of armed forces and armaments could be worked out.

This proposal opened the door to further progress. It gave new impetus to the work of the U.N. disarmament subcommittee, which took up the President's plan as its first order of business when it convened in New York on August 31.⁷

At these meetings we were, unfortunately, unable to get Soviet acceptance of the proposal. But they have not yet rejected it, and there is hope that further study will convince them of its mutual desirability.

Disarmament is one of the three items on the agenda of the Big Four Foreign Ministers meeting now taking place in Geneva. It is scheduled to come up for discussion this week. We remain hopeful that direct negotiations with the Soviets may produce the key to further progress on this vital issue.

The Palestine Situation

The tragic clashes last week between Israeli and Egyptian forces are a matter of utmost concern to us and to the United Nations. They involved the heaviest fighting in Palestine since 1948. In 1949 the armistice arranged by the United Nations put an end to the conflict. You will recall that an American, Dr. Ralph Bunche, was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1950 for his work in achieving the Palestine armistice.

Since 1948 the armistice, supervised by United Nations observers, has been maintained. It has been an uneasy armistice, it is true. There have been ugly incidents. It has not led to real peace. But a renewal of the war between the parties was prevented—and that in itself must count as a major accomplishment of the United Nations.

What makes this latest clash so serious is that it follows so closely the new Soviet involvement in the Middle East. To my mind, it is no mere coincidence that the recent fighting broke out so soon

⁵ *Ibid.*, Aug. 1, 1955, p. 173.

⁷ *Ibid.*, Sept. 12, 1955, p. 438; Oct. 31, 1955, p. 703; and Nov. 7, 1955, p. 765.

⁶ *Ibid.*, Nov. 21, 1955, p. 855.

after the consummation of the sale of arms to Egypt by the Soviet bloc. We foresaw that the Communist action would dangerously aggravate the tense fears and suspicions between the people of Israel and the people of the Arab States.

Neither the free world nor the Communist world can benefit from the outbreak of war in the Middle East. It is a grave threat to international peace and security. For 7 years the United Nations has successfully kept the situation within bounds.

Once again the United Nations, faced with still another crucial test, must use its influence to remove this continuing threat to world peace. The patience and cooperation of all peace-loving countries is essential to this process.

The world waits to see whether in this explosive situation the Communist states will pay only lip-service to the spirit of Geneva or whether they will genuinely cooperate to maintain the peace. They can make it easier or harder for us and for the United Nations. I can assure you though that, whatever course they take, we will never stop trying to bring peace to this sorely troubled part of the world.

The meeting of Heads of Governments in Geneva in July was described by the Secretary of State as the "first stage" of new efforts "to reduce the danger of war and to solve outstanding issues by negotiation." We are now in the "second stage," where the spirit of Geneva is being tested. One of the continuing testing areas is the United Nations.

We have noticed recently, I am glad to say, a real moderation in the tone of Soviet statements in the United Nations. We have been spared this year the anti-American invective to which we had become accustomed. This is all to the good. But still these are only words—and words are not enough.

We are watching and sincerely hoping that the U.S.S.R. will *act* as well as *talk* in the spirit of Geneva. We do not ask or expect the impossible. But is it not reasonable to expect some concrete deeds in the great forum of the U.N. that will help reduce the causes of tension between the East and West? Here are some examples of what I am talking about:

1. If the Soviet Union would accept the President's aerial inspection plan, it would do much to dispel the clouds of suspicion and distrust that exist between the Communist and non-Communist

worlds and to push open the door to progressive and effective disarmament.

2. If the Soviets would agree to abandon the use of the veto on the admission of new members—thus enabling many peace-loving nations like Austria, Italy, Ireland, and Japan, to mention only a few, to enter—they could help inject new vigor and new vitality into the United Nations.

3. If they would permanently cease the delaying tactics which they used until recently on the peaceful uses of atomic energy and constructively help to get the new agency under way, they could demonstrate their real interest in bringing to men everywhere a better way of life.

4. If they would stop jamming radio broadcasts into the Soviet Union they could remove, at a single stroke, a major barrier that has existed to the free exchange of ideas in the world.

5. If they would cease to aggravate the explosive situation in the Middle East by trafficking in arms, they could do much to ease tensions there and make a major contribution toward world peace.

Action on one or all of these items would be a welcome sign of Soviet good faith. So far such signs are lacking. We are reminded somehow of the Biblical comment: "The voice is Jacob's voice, but the hands are the hands of Esau."

Concluding Comments

We have been looking at the United Nations from the point of view of our own national interest—of what we are getting from our participation. I think we can draw some valid conclusions.

The United Nations helps our own security by promoting the principle of collective self-defense;

It has put out the spark of conflict before it became a conflagration in a number of cases, and many people believe it has prevented the outbreak of a third great war;

It has marshaled public opinion in support of free-world objectives;

It has exposed the nature and danger of Communist imperialism;

It provides an arena for diplomatic negotiation to advance our foreign policy objectives;

It is promoting social progress and better standards of life and helping peoples toward responsible self-government.

All these things are clearly in our national interest, and they are things which we could not do at all, or nearly so well, alone.

It is said that you get out of any endeavor just about what you put in. The American people and the American Government have supported the United Nations concept from the very beginning. Its charter was written in San Francisco. Its headquarters are established in New York. We provide a third of its annual upkeep. We are the heaviest contributors to the specialized agencies and the technical aid programs. We have, therefore, a very special stake in the success of the United Nations.

I am confident that our returns will continue to exceed our investment. An essential part of this investment, of course, is the continuing interest, support, and critical understanding of the American people. This is the kind of interest and support which is exemplified by the many meetings which public-spirited citizens have held throughout the United States celebrating the 10th anniversary of the United Nations.

Committee on Information From Non-Self-Governing Territories

Statement by Laird Bell

U.S. Representative to the General Assembly¹

My delegation favors the continuation of the Committee on Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories. It favors the committee's continuation on the basis that will bring the greatest benefit both to the peoples of non-self-governing territories and to the United Nations itself. We believe that for the truly effective continuation of the committee, the cooperation of the principal administering members is essential.

Yesterday, the representative of the United Kingdom [B. O. B. Gidden] stated in the clearest possible terms that his Government would feel obliged to cease its participation in the Committee on Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories if the General Assembly were to adopt the amendment to draft resolution B contained

¹ Made in Committee IV (Trusteeship) on Oct. 27 (U.S. delegation press release 2250). For a statement by Mr. Bell in Committee IV on Oct. 12, see BULLETIN of Oct. 24, 1955, p. 673.

in document A/C.4/L.393² or any other amendment which would have the effect of expanding the terms of reference of the committee. On the other hand, he indicated that if the committee were to be continued on its present basis for another 3 years, his delegation would continue to cooperate in its work.

I feel sure that the sponsors of amendment 393 did not desire to present the committee with such a difficult and painful choice. My delegation recognizes and respects the constructive intentions which we believe motivated the sponsoring delegations in the presentation of their amendment, namely, to render more logical and useful the reports of the Committee on Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories. We believe that the idea of treating together problems that are similar because of regional or other factors has much to commend it. The committee has already begun to follow this practice in its reports. The sponsors wish this practice to be expanded.

My delegation understands this wish, but it does not believe that the relatively small gains in techniques which this amendment would make possible are worth the very heavy price of losing the cooperation of the power administering the greatest number of non-self-governing peoples. In our view, the value of the Committee on Information would be largely destroyed if it lost the cooperation of this member which not only has the greatest responsibilities for peoples of non-self-governing territories but also has made very substantial contributions to the work of the committee. Fully as serious would be the loss of a forum where administering and nonadministering members may carry on an honest exchange of views and ideas about the problems of these people.

My delegation believes that the Committee on Information has been a useful and valuable instrument of the United Nations, that the exchange of views between administering and nonadministering members and the spirit of cooperation that it has promoted has broadened our horizons and been of real benefit to the work of the United Nations in this field. We believe that it will be a serious

² This amendment would have authorized the Committee on Information to study ways in which it could deal with problems common to a number of territories or groups of territories. As at present constituted, the committee is only competent to deal with the territories as a whole, not individually.

matter for the United Nations for these values to be jeopardized. It is the belief of my delegation that we, the members of this committee, would demonstrate practical wisdom and real statesmanship if we placed the continuation of the Committee on Information on an effective basis above even reasonable efforts to spell out means of improving the technical value of its reports. Such improvements would be empty indeed if they sacrificed the essential spirit of the committee.

We beg our colleagues to reflect and to weigh the alternatives before them with the greatest of care before taking any action which will have such grave practical consequences for the Committee on Information and the non-self-governing peoples for whose benefit it was created, as well as for the United Nations itself, which would suffer a serious blow as the result of failure to continue effective work in this field. In particular, my delegation would appeal to the sponsors of the amendment to consider withdrawing their amendment in order that we may continue to have an effective committee to carry out this important work. We can assure them that, if they do so, my delegation will continue its efforts to improve the work of the committee and the technical value of its reports. We are sure that all members of the committee will do likewise and that this is the soundest way to proceed for the benefit of non-self-governing peoples and the United Nations itself.³

U.S. Delegations to International Conferences

ECE Committee on Electric Power

The Department of State announced on November 18 (press release 656) that Ancher Nelsen, Administrator of the Rural Electrification Administration, Department of Agriculture, has been designated the U.S. delegate to the Thirteenth Session of the Committee on Electric Power,

³ The sponsors of the amendment (Burma, Liberia, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Thailand) agreed not to insist on a vote. Committee IV, on Oct. 27, approved a resolution (A/C.4/L.406) recommending that the Committee on Information be renewed on the same basis as before for a further 3-year period. The resolution was approved in plenary session on Nov. 8 with 54 in favor, 1 against (Belgium), and 2 abstentions (South Africa, United Kingdom).

which is to open at Geneva on December 1. This committee is one of the principal subsidiary organs established by the U.N. Economic Commission for Europe. One of the chief concerns of the committee is the field of rural electrification.

Mr. Nelsen will also serve as the principal spokesman for the United States at the Third Session of the committee's Working Party on Rural Electrification, which convenes at Geneva on November 28.

Prior to these meetings, a field trip, sponsored by the Austrian Government, will be made to certain rural electrification installations in Austria, starting at Linz on November 22 and ending at Innsbruck on November 27.

TREATY INFORMATION

Extension to Netherlands Antilles of Income-Tax Convention

ENTRY INTO FORCE OF SUPPLEMENTARY PROTOCOL

Press release 643 dated November 10

On November 10, 1955, ratifications were exchanged with respect to the protocol of June 15, 1955, supplementing the convention of April 29, 1948, between the United States and the Netherlands for the avoidance of double taxation with respect to taxes on income and certain other taxes.

Pursuant to the terms of the supplementary protocol, it entered into force upon the exchange of instruments of ratification. The protocol was concluded for the purpose of facilitating the extension of the operation of the 1948 convention to the Netherlands Antilles. The substantive provisions of the protocol are contained in two articles, as follows:

ARTICLE I

In the application by the Netherlands Antilles of Article XIX of the convention of April 29, 1948, paragraph (3) thereof shall be replaced by the following paragraph:

(3) The Netherlands Antilles shall allow a deduction (or the equivalent thereof) from its tax of the Federal

income tax paid to the United States by citizens of the United States resident in the Netherlands Antilles with respect to income of such citizens from sources within the United States, but in an amount not in excess of that proportion of the entire Netherlands Antilles tax which such income bears to the entire income subject to such Netherlands Antilles tax.

ARTICLE II

In the application to the Netherlands Antilles of Article XXVII of the convention of April 29, 1948, the word "following", as it appears in paragraph (2) of the said Article XXVII, shall be replaced by the words "immediately preceding".

The supplementary protocol does not itself effect the extension to the Netherlands Antilles. Upon entry into force of the supplementary protocol, the only remaining action necessary to make effective the extension to the Netherlands Antilles, in accordance with procedures prescribed in article XXVII of the 1948 convention (Treaties and Other International Acts Series 1855; 62 Stat., pt. 2, 1757), is a written notice to the Netherlands Government of the acceptance by the U.S. Government of the proposal for that purpose made in a Netherlands notification dated June 24, 1952.

EXTENSION OF CONVENTION

Press release 646 dated November 15

On November 10, 1955, the operation of the income-tax convention of April 29, 1948, as modified and supplemented by the protocol of June 15, 1955, was extended to the Netherlands Antilles, operative retroactively on and after January 1, 1955.

Article XXVII of the 1948 convention¹ prescribes the procedure whereby the application of the convention may be extended, in whole or in part, to overseas areas under the jurisdiction of either Government. Pursuant to Article XXVII, the Netherlands Government gave written notification dated June 24, 1952, of the desire of the Government of the Netherlands Antilles that the operation of the convention be extended thereto.

The Netherlands proposal was submitted to the Senate for approval. On July 29, 1955, the same day on which it gave advice and consent to ratification of the supplementary protocol of June 15, 1955, the Senate approved the proposal for extending to the Netherlands Antilles the operation of the convention, subject to certain limitations and understandings in addition to the modifications ef-

fected by the protocol. The Netherlands Government, after consultation with the authorities of the Netherlands Antilles, has expressed concurrence with respect to those limitations and understandings, which are as follows:

1. Article I (1) of the convention shall have application to the Netherlands Antilles only in respect of income taxes and profits taxes, since no property tax is levied in that jurisdiction.

2. In the application of Article II (1) (j) of the convention, the term "competent authority" shall be understood to mean, in the case of the Netherlands Antilles, the *Administrateur van Financien* or his duly authorized representative.

3. Paragraphs (2) and (3) of Article VI of the convention shall have no application in the Netherlands Antilles, since the agreements of 1926 and 1939 referred to therein have no application to the Netherlands Antilles.

4. Articles XI and XIII of the convention shall be deemed to be deleted and of no effect, and Article XIV is modified, in accordance with the reservations agreed upon with respect to the convention.

5. Article XX of the convention shall have no application in the Netherlands Antilles, since the provisions thereof relating to certain Netherlands property taxes have no bearing on Netherlands Antilles taxes.

6. In extending to the Netherlands Antilles the application of the convention of April 29, 1948, as supplemented by the protocol of June 15, 1955, the collection provision in Article XXII will be restricted in its application so that each of the Governments may assist in collecting the other's taxes only to the extent necessary to insure that the provisions of the convention shall not be enjoyed by persons not entitled to its benefits.

Upon entry into force of the supplementary protocol on November 10, 1955, the only remaining action necessary to make effective the extension to the Netherlands Antilles was a written notice to the Netherlands Government of the acceptance by the United States Government of the proposal for that purpose made in the Netherlands notification dated June 24, 1952. That notice of acceptance was communicated to the Netherlands Government through diplomatic channels on November 10, 1955.

The Netherlands Antilles are a group of islands, sometimes called the Dutch West Indies, off the coast of Venezuela, including Aruba, Bonaire, Curaçao, Saba, St. Eustalius, and the Netherlands

¹Treaties and Other International Acts Series 1855; 62 Stat., pt. 2, 1757.

part of St. Martin, all coming within the scope of the income-tax law generally referred to as an Ordinance of Curaçao.

United States and Japan Sign Atomic Energy Agreement

Press release 645 dated November 14

Representatives of Japan and the United States on November 14 signed the agreement for cooperation for research in the peaceful uses of atomic energy which was initialed on June 21, 1955.

The Japanese Government was represented at the signing ceremony by Ambassador Sadao Iguchi. William J. Sebald, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, and Lewis L. Strauss, Chairman of the United States Atomic Energy Commission, signed the agreement on behalf of the United States.

Pursuant to article 9 of the agreement, it will come into force following an exchange of notes between the two Governments establishing that all constitutional or statutory procedures to give legal effect to the agreement have been completed. The procedural steps required by the United States Atomic Energy Act of 1954 have been taken by the executive and legislative branches of the United States. The agreement is subject to the approval of the Japanese Diet.

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Automotive Traffic

Convention on road traffic, with annexes. Dated at Geneva September 19, 1949. Entered into force March 26, 1952. TIAS 2487.

Ratification deposited: Austria, November 2, 1955.

Telecommunications

International telecommunication convention. Signed at Buenos Aires December 22, 1952. Entered into force January 1, 1954. TIAS 3266.

Ratification deposited: Turkey, October 6, 1955.

Weather

Convention of the World Meteorological Organization. Done at Washington October 11, 1947. Entered into force March 23, 1950. TIAS 2052.

Accession deposited: Cambodia, November 8, 1955.

BILATERAL

Dominican Republic

Agreement for a cooperative agriculture program pursuant to the general agreement for technical cooperation of February 20, 1951 (TIAS 2226). Effected by

exchange of notes of June 22 and 30, 1955, and signature of a confirming agreement at Ciudad Trujillo October 13, 1955. Entered into force June 30, 1955.

Haiti

Agreement for a Joint Council for Economic Aid to facilitate administration of the emergency assistance program provided by the exchange of notes of March 22 and April 1, 1955 (TIAS 3232). Effected by exchange of notes at Port-au-Prince April 15, 16, 26, and 27, 1955. Entered into force April 27, 1955.

Netherlands

Arrangement relating to certificates of airworthiness for imported aircraft. Effected by exchange of notes at The Hague September 19 and November 4, 1955. Enters into force on date of receipt by the United States of a notification of constitutional approval by the Netherlands.

Protocol supplementing the convention of April 29, 1948 (TIAS 1855) with respect to taxes on income and certain other taxes to facilitate extension to the Netherlands Antilles. Signed at Washington June 15, 1955. *Ratifications exchanged:* November 10, 1955.

Entered into force: November 10, 1955.

Proclaimed by the President: November 14, 1955.

Agreement providing for application of income tax convention of April 29, 1948 (TIAS 1855), as supplemented by the protocol of June 15, 1955 (TIAS 3366), to the Netherlands Antilles. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington June 24 and August 7, 1952, September 15, November 4 and 10, 1955. Entered into force November 10, 1955.

Peru

Agreement for performance by members of Army, Navy, and Military Aviation Missions of duties specified in article V of Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement of February 22, 1952 (TIAS 2466). Effected by exchange of notes at Lima June 28, July 18, October 20 and 28, 1955. Entered into force October 28, 1955.

THE DEPARTMENT

Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration et al.¹

FUNCTIONS AND AUTHORITIES

Pursuant to the authority vested in the Secretary of State by sections 3 and 4 of Public Law 73, 81st Congress, approved May 26, 1949 (63 Stat. 111), and in accordance with the requirements of section 3 (a) (1) of Public Law 404, 79th Congress, approved June 11, 1946 (60 Stat. 238), functions and authorities are hereby prescribed for the positions enumerated below. All prior delegations of authority and public notices which are inconsistent or in conflict with the functions and authorities herein prescribed are, to the extent of such inconsistencies or conflicts, hereby superseded. Nothing contained herein shall authorize the exercise of authority which by law is required to be exercised solely by the Secretary of State.

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration

¹ Public Notice 144, 20 Fed. Reg. 8356.

November 28, 1955

tion. a. Exercises the authority vested in the Secretary of State by section 3 of Public Law 73, 81st Congress, to "administer, coordinate, and direct the Foreign Service of the United States and the personnel of the State Department."

b. Exercises the authority now or hereafter vested in the Secretary of State or the Department of State with respect to the administration of the Department of State and the Foreign Service.

c. Provides general direction and control of the organizational structure and assignment of functions in the Department of State and the Foreign Service.

d. Provides general direction for the use of appropriated funds, for the establishment of program priorities for budgetary purposes, and the administrative implementation of approved substantive policies and programs.

e. Directs the administration of the Department's instructional programs.

f. Directs the activities of the Foreign Service Institute.

g. Directs and supervises the activities of the Assistant Secretary-Controller, the Administrator of the Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs, and the Director General of the Foreign Service.

h. Prescribes and promulgates such rules and regulations, and makes such delegations of authority as may be necessary to carry out his assigned responsibilities.

Assistant Secretary-Controller. a. Develops, establishes, revises and promulgates the organizational structure and assignment of functions in the Department and the Foreign Service.

b. Directs the administration of the personnel program of the Department and the Foreign Service.

c. Directs preparation of budget estimates and the allocation of funds made available to the Secretary or the Department.

d. Establishes relative program priorities for budgetary purposes and supervises the use of appropriated funds in accordance with congressional limitations, program objectives, and policies of the President and the Secretary.

e. Directs the development and operation of administrative management controls including fiscal controls, reporting systems, manuals of regulations and procedures, etc., designed to promote efficient, economical and effective operation in all areas of the Department and the Foreign Service, and to enforce compliance with established policies and instructions.

f. Directs and provides for the acquisition, maintenance and operation of buildings, grounds, and other facilities required for use in connection with the Department's operations abroad.

g. Directs and provides procurement, communication, transportation, fiscal and other administrative services.

h. Prescribes and promulgates such rules and regulations, and makes such delegations of authority as may be necessary to carry out his assigned responsibilities.

i. Acts for the Deputy Under Secretary for Administration in his absence.

Administrator, Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs.

a. Provides technical direction for the consular program of the Foreign Service and directs related work of the Department, including such activities as passport services,

protection and welfare of American citizens and interests, issuance of visas, representation of interests of foreign governments, control of international traffic in arms, and policies concerning disclosure of classified military information.

b. Directs the security program of the Department and the Foreign Service.

c. Directs the administration of the Refugee Relief Program established by the Refugee Relief Act of 1953, Public Law 203, 83d Congress (67 Stat. 400).

d. Prescribes and promulgates such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out his assigned responsibilities.

Dated: October 29, 1955.

[SEAL]

HERBERT HOOVER, Jr.,
Acting Secretary of State.

Appointments

Guilford S. Jameson, as Deputy Director for Congressional Relations of the International Cooperation Administration, effective November 1.

Designations

Jacob D. Beam as Deputy Assistant Secretary for European Affairs, effective November 15.

Francis B. Stevens as Director, Office of Eastern European Affairs, effective November 15.

Check List of Department of State Press Releases: November 14-20

Releases may be obtained from the News Division, Department of State, Washington 25, D. C.

Press releases issued prior to November 14 which appear in this issue of the BULLETIN are Nos. 643 of November 10 and 644 of November 11.

No.	Date	Subject
645	11/14	Signing of atomic agreement with Japan.
646	11/15	Tax convention extended to Netherlands Antilles.
647	11/15	Cancellation of visas for Soviet Archbishop and secretary.
648	11/16	Itinerary for Holland-Waugh trip (rewrite).
649	11/16	Tripartite Geneva declaration.
650	11/16	Surplus commodity agreement with Brazil.
†651	11/17	Notes exchanged on St. Lawrence Seaway.
*652	11/17	Educational exchange.
653	11/17	Visit of Cambodian religious leader.
654	11/17	Holland: departure for South America.
655	11/18	Payment under Claims Convention with Mexico.
656	11/18	Delegate to electric power meeting (rewrite).
657	11/18	Return of Mohammed V to Morocco.
†658	11/18	Exhibit of Korean national treasures.
659	11/18	Dulles: "Report on the Foreign Ministers Conference."
660	11/19	U.S. liaison with Baghdad Pact organization.

*Not printed.

†Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

American Principles. The Principle of Self-Determination in International Relations (Murphy)	889	Mexico. Mexico Makes Final Payment Under 1941 Claims Convention	896
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